[EM] Favorite Betrayal and Condorcet

[Forest Simmons]

That makes a lot of sense!

El lun., 18 de abr. de 2022 6:36 p. m., Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
escribió:

> Hi Forest, I don't follow what you say below. The DSV method should surely
> operate on
> sincere ballots to find the promised equilibrium. So every favorite F
> should already be
> approved.
>
> The easiest illustrative situation is where there is no CW (either sincere
> or voted), but
> some voters can abandon one of their first preferences in order to give a
> different first
> preference a win that makes them the CW.
>
> Kevin
>
>
>
> Le lundi 18 avril 2022, 18:11:37 UTC−5, Forest Simmons <
> forest.simmons21 at gmail.com> a écrit :
>
> Your comments remind me that (if I remember correctly) there is supposed
> to always exists a Nash equilibrium approval ballot set which elects the
> sincere CW candidate when one exists.
>
> But a DSV method that finds such an equilibrium (along with its
> concomitant candidate) would have to satisfy the FBC, since any one voter
> defecting from that equilibrium to approve her favorite F would get away
> with it ... if the winner changed at all it would have to change to F.
>
> So all we need is a constructive proof of the alleged Nash Equilibrium
> existence.
>
> Can someone clear up this mystery?
>
>
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