[EM] So I got an email... / IIA

[Forest Simmons]

Thanks for that fact check.

My memory is not as good as it used to be but I remember how amazed I was
at the time to see a clone dependent Condorcet method with a clone
dependent completion method recommended in print!

El lun., 11 de abr. de 2022 2:07 p. m., Hahn, Paul <manynote at wustl.edu>
escribió:

> Robert, here's the paragraph that recommends a specific completion method:
>
> "Majority rule still fails to work well sometimes, as the Condorcet
> paradox shows, though less often than other voting rules do. And in such
> cases, it has to be modified to identify a winner. There are many ways this
> can be done. Perhaps the simplest modification is as follows: If no one
> obtains a majority against all opponents, then among those candidates who
> defeat the most opponents in head-to-head comparisons, select as winner the
> one with the highest rank-order score."
>
> That sounds like Copeland, completed with Borda, to me too.
>
> --pH
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Election-Methods <election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com> On
> Behalf Of robert bristow-johnson
> Sent: Monday, April 11, 2022 2:30 PM
> To: Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com>; Forest Simmons <
> forest.simmons21 at gmail.com>
> Cc: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] So I got an email... / IIA
>
>
>
> > On 04/11/2022 3:10 PM Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > The Hare system is at-large STV/PR, as Thomas Hare clearly advocated.
> Basically the right way of doing elections.
>
> Do you mean multi-winner elections?  (Even so, it might be a disputed
> notion.)
>
> > It's wrong to attach his name to single members.
>
>
> In my opinion, William Ware's contribution to the thing is virtually a
> "nothing burger".  It is Thomas Hare who is credited with the idea of the
> Single Transferrable Vote and that is the key innovation that was used to
> convince policy makers that were was no multiplication of votes and made
> the method feasible.
>
> > The drawback of Condorcet pairing is that it loses more than binary
> comparisons. It loses the ordinal scale information of preference voting.
>
> That makes pretty much no sense to me.  The ballots are **purely** ordinal
> and that ballot information is not lost in Condorcet.  But for each
> individual pairing, there are only two rankings that mean anything.
>
> > Not using voting methods that lose, rather than use, information is the
> consideration...
> >
>
> What information is lost?  Because I can certainly point to how
> information is obscured with Hare RCV that results in the Center Squeeze
> (which is the root flaw that broke the Burlington 2009 election).
>
> >
> > On 11/04/2022 05:34, Forest Simmons wrote:
> >
> > > As I remember, Maskin's Sci. Am. article advocated Copeland completed
> with Borda.
> > >
>
> I don't see a completion method at all mentioned in the article.  The
> author's define "an electoral system called true majority rule (or simple
> majority rule), in which voters submit rankings of all the candidates and
> the winner is the one who beats each opponent in head-to-head competition
> based on these rankings."
>
> It's just straight-ahead Condorcet.
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
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> info
>
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