[EM] So I got an email... / IIA

[Hahn, Paul]

Robert, here's the paragraph that recommends a specific completion method:

"Majority rule still fails to work well sometimes, as the Condorcet paradox shows, though less often than other voting rules do. And in such cases, it has to be modified to identify a winner. There are many ways this can be done. Perhaps the simplest modification is as follows: If no one obtains a majority against all opponents, then among those candidates who defeat the most opponents in head-to-head comparisons, select as winner the one with the highest rank-order score."

That sounds like Copeland, completed with Borda, to me too.

--pH

-----Original Message-----
From: Election-Methods <election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com> On Behalf Of robert bristow-johnson
Sent: Monday, April 11, 2022 2:30 PM
To: Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com>; Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com>
Cc: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
Subject: Re: [EM] So I got an email... / IIA



> On 04/11/2022 3:10 PM Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The Hare system is at-large STV/PR, as Thomas Hare clearly advocated. Basically the right way of doing elections.

Do you mean multi-winner elections?  (Even so, it might be a disputed notion.)

> It's wrong to attach his name to single members. 
 

In my opinion, William Ware's contribution to the thing is virtually a "nothing burger".  It is Thomas Hare who is credited with the idea of the Single Transferrable Vote and that is the key innovation that was used to convince policy makers that were was no multiplication of votes and made the method feasible.

> The drawback of Condorcet pairing is that it loses more than binary comparisons. It loses the ordinal scale information of preference voting. 

That makes pretty much no sense to me.  The ballots are **purely** ordinal and that ballot information is not lost in Condorcet.  But for each individual pairing, there are only two rankings that mean anything.  

> Not using voting methods that lose, rather than use, information is the consideration...
> 

What information is lost?  Because I can certainly point to how information is obscured with Hare RCV that results in the Center Squeeze (which is the root flaw that broke the Burlington 2009 election).

> 
> On 11/04/2022 05:34, Forest Simmons wrote:
> 
> > As I remember, Maskin's Sci. Am. article advocated Copeland completed with Borda.
> > 

I don't see a completion method at all mentioned in the article.  The author's define "an electoral system called true majority rule (or simple majority rule), in which voters submit rankings of all the candidates and the winner is the one who beats each opponent in head-to-head competition based on these rankings."

It's just straight-ahead Condorcet.

--

r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

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