[EM] RCV Challenge

Forest Simmons forest.simmons21 at gmail.com
Fri Dec 24 20:21:29 PST 2021

And yes, in the extremely rare event of an exact tie for highest Implicit
Approval, random ballot would be the best resolution ... but it was fun
seeing how it could be done deterministically by applying the method
recursively to the tied set.

However, that works only because each recursion step automatically entails
a renormalization of IA, despite previous remarks against IA
renormalizations after eliminations, that in general cannot apply to proper

El vie., 24 de dic. de 2021 3:27 p. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet at t-online.de> escribió:

> On 25.12.2021 00:18, Forest Simmons wrote:
> > My proposal, Implicit Approval Chain Climbing (IACC), needs a tie
> > breaker. For that purpose we require each candidate to submit a
> > recommended tie breaking order. The order submitted by the highest
> > implicit approval candidate will be used.
> >
> > In the rare event that the tie is for highest implicit approval, break
> > this tie by applying the IACC method recursively to a copy of the ballot
> > set restricted to the candidates tied for highest IA.
> >
> > Does that "tie up" all of the loose ends?
> I'd probably just use random ballot; seems simpler... although there is
> the possible summability problem.
> However, the method has (as all implicit approval methods have) the
> somewhat undesirable property that if everybody fully ranks the
> candidates, then it's completely indecisive.
> -km
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