[EM] Agenda Based Banks
Susan Simmons
suzerainsimmons at outlook.com
Mon Aug 2 12:31:35 PDT 2021
It turns out that this method as it stands is not monotonic, but if you omit the downward part, then the remaining simpler version is monotonic:
First initialize a set named "TheBank" with the most promising agenda item.
Then, as long as even one agenda item pairwise beats every member ofTheBank, deposit the least promising of these into TheBank.
Elect the final deposit.
This simple Banks compliant method is a generalization of TACC (Total Approval Chain Climbing).
The only thing I don't like about it is that even when the most promising agenda item is in the Banks set, as likely as not it will elect a different member of that set. My tweak was designed to overcome that "defect" while preserving Banks efficiency. But it's not worth the loss of monotonicity.
Furthermore, it may turn out that the supposed "defect" actually confers burial resistance ... for example ...
45 A>B (sincere A>C)
25 B>C
30 C>A
Ballot pairwise beat cycle: A>B>C>A
Agenda: C<B<A
(based on implicit approval, for example)
TheBank deposits are C, then B... so B wins.... the A faction burial of C backfires by getting its least favorite B elected!
Sent from my MetroPCS 4G LTE Android Device
-------- Mensaje original --------
De: Susan Simmons <suzerainsimmons at outlook.com>
Fecha: 1/8/21 2:15 p. m. (GMT-08:00)
A: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
Asunto: Agenda Based Banks
First initialize a set named "TheBank" with the most promising agenda item.
Then, as long as even one agenda item is beaten pairwise by every member of TheBank, add the most promising of these to TheBank.
After that, as long as even one agenda item pairwise beats every member ofTheBank, deposit the least promising of these into TheBank.
Finally, elect the member of TheBank that pairwise beats all of its other members.
I believe that this method satisfies mono-raise as long as the agenda does.
If so, then this is the best agenda based method so far, because (1) no other agenda based method is simpler to describe or compute, and (2) it always elects from a proper subclass of Landau called "Banks", without need for any mention of "covering" or for that matter, "Condorcet", "Landau", or "maximal chain".
If this is true, then there is no good excuse for continuing to propose make-shift tweaks of second and third rate election methods. In particular, ignorance and misplaced zeal are not good excuses!
Sent from my MetroPCS 4G LTE Android Device
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