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<div>It turns out that this method as it stands is not monotonic, but if you omit the downward part, then the remaining simpler version is monotonic:</div>
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<div>First initialize a set named "TheBank" with the most promising agenda item. </div>
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<div>Then, as long as even one agenda item pairwise beats every member ofTheBank, deposit the least promising of these into TheBank. </div>
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<div>Elect the final deposit.</div>
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<div>This simple Banks compliant method is a generalization of TACC (Total Approval Chain Climbing).</div>
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<div>The only thing I don't like about it is that even when the most promising agenda item is in the Banks set, as likely as not it will elect a different member of that set. My tweak was designed to overcome that "defect" while preserving Banks efficiency.
But it's not worth the loss of monotonicity. </div>
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<div>Furthermore, it may turn out that the supposed "defect" actually confers burial resistance ... for example ...</div>
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<div>45 A>B (sincere A>C)</div>
<div>25 B>C</div>
<div>30 C>A</div>
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<div>Ballot pairwise beat cycle: A>B>C>A</div>
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<div>Agenda: C<B<A</div>
<div>(based on implicit approval, for example)</div>
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<div>TheBank deposits are C, then B... so B wins.... the A faction burial of C backfires by getting its least favorite B elected!</div>
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<div style="font-size:85%;color:#575757" dir="auto">Sent from my MetroPCS 4G LTE Android Device</div>
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<div style="font-size:100%;color:#000000"><!-- originalMessage -->
<div>-------- Mensaje original --------</div>
<div>De: Susan Simmons <suzerainsimmons@outlook.com> </div>
<div>Fecha: 1/8/21 2:15 p. m. (GMT-08:00) </div>
<div>A: election-methods@lists.electorama.com </div>
<div>Asunto: Agenda Based Banks </div>
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<div>First initialize a set named "TheBank" with the most promising agenda item. </div>
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<div>Then, as long as even one agenda item is beaten pairwise by every member of TheBank, add the most promising of these to TheBank. </div>
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<div>After that, as long as even one agenda item pairwise beats every member ofTheBank, deposit the least promising of these into TheBank. </div>
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<div>Finally, elect the member of TheBank that pairwise beats all of its other members.</div>
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<div>I believe that this method satisfies mono-raise as long as the agenda does.</div>
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<div>If so, then this is the best agenda based method so far, because (1) no other agenda based method is simpler to describe or compute, and (2) it always elects from a proper subclass of Landau called "Banks", without need for any mention of "covering" or
for that matter, "Condorcet", "Landau", or "maximal chain".</div>
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<div>If this is true, then there is no good excuse for continuing to propose make-shift tweaks of second and third rate election methods. In particular, ignorance and misplaced zeal are not good excuses!</div>
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<div id="composer_signature">
<div dir="auto" style="font-size:85%; color:#575757">Sent from my MetroPCS 4G LTE Android Device</div>
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