[EM] ART Single Winner Method

Nathaniel Allen npwning at gmail.com
Mon Dec 7 08:59:15 PST 2020

Hey Kevin,

Thanks for the feedback! I wonder if the Clone-Loser situation still
applies in a circumstance where more preference can be expressed. For
instance, in this method "Approved" simply means combined 2's and 3's.



On Wed, Dec 2, 2020 at 9:23 PM Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:

> Hi Nate,
> Using Approval to select two finalists has been proposed many times over
> the years, but what has never sat well with me is the theoretical
> Clone-Loser issue. A candidate who wins by approval, but who can't beat the
> #2 candidate by approval, could in theory run with a partner try to claim
> both of the top approval spots. It might not help very often, I would
> admit. It would probably be a more prevalent strategy in a race where
> voters are primarily concerned about which party wins and not which
> candidate.
> I'm not sure I've heard before, the specific idea to take these approval
> finalists and do the head-to-head comparison instantly. (With other ways of
> selecting finalists, yes... For instance staples of mine are pitting the
> top-ranking winner against the approval winner, or the top-ranking winner
> against the candidate who is most approved on the ballots not approving the
> top-ranking winner.)
> From a Condorcet standpoint, you're only using one pairwise contest. IRV,
> too, will use one, once you're at two candidates remaining. So I don't
> think the Condorcet element is so evident.
> Kevin
> Le mercredi 2 décembre 2020 à 21:31:16 UTC−6, Nathaniel Allen <
> npwning at gmail.com> a écrit :
> >Hey all,
> >
> >Rob asked me to send out this method I've created to see what everyone
> thinks. I call it 'ART' for
> >Approval, Runoff Tally (in the name of a good acronym). The method works
> as follows: Voters rank
> >each candidate 'Good', 'Acceptable', or 'Bad' (like 321). To find the
> winner you simply add up the
> >'Acceptable' and 'Good' scores for each candidate and the top two
> advance, ensuring whoever wins
> >is amongst the most favorable. Then the winner is selected based on a
> head-to-head automatic
> >runoff, higher score on more ballots wins. The condorcet winner wins
> every time in this method except
> >when they are not among the most approved. This is the biggest question I
> have however, I think that
> >the weight of Approval in this method is stronger than condorcet winning
> (especially in a method where
> >head-to-head tie scores are possible). The condorcet loser never wins.
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