[EM] ART Single Winner Method
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue Dec 8 16:37:12 PST 2020
I'm not sure what you have in mind there. The fact that the 2/3s only differ in effect for the "second phase" (the pairwise contest) is practically the source of the issue I would say. If one attempts the nomination strategy, the goal is to grab both finalist positions, before the distinction between 2/3 makes any difference. If the distinction mattered earlier, in some way, perhaps it could be made impossible for the same voters to select both finalists.
I do think as well, as it stands, that someone could give you some grief that a candidate who uniquely possesses "3" ratings from more than half the voters could theoretically fail to be a finalist. (Like if voters give out "2" ratings generously.)
Le lundi 7 décembre 2020 à 10:59:28 UTC−6, Nathaniel Allen <npwning at gmail.com> a écrit :
>Thanks for the feedback! I wonder if the Clone-Loser situation still applies in a circumstance where more
>preference can be expressed. For instance, in this method "Approved" simply means combined 2's and
>On Wed, Dec 2, 2020 at 9:23 PM Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:
>> Hi Nate,
>> Using Approval to select two finalists has been proposed many times over the years, but what has never sat well with me is the theoretical Clone->Loser issue. A candidate who wins by approval, but who can't beat the #2 candidate by approval, could in theory run with a partner try to claim both >of the top approval spots. It might not help very often, I would admit. It would probably be a more prevalent strategy in a race where voters are >primarily concerned about which party wins and not which candidate.
>> I'm not sure I've heard before, the specific idea to take these approval finalists and do the head-to-head comparison instantly. (With other ways of >selecting finalists, yes... For instance staples of mine are pitting the top-ranking winner against the approval winner, or the top-ranking winner >against the candidate who is most approved on the ballots not approving the top-ranking winner.)
>> From a Condorcet standpoint, you're only using one pairwise contest. IRV, too, will use one, once you're at two candidates remaining. So I don't >think the Condorcet element is so evident.
>> Le mercredi 2 décembre 2020 à 21:31:16 UTC−6, Nathaniel Allen <npwning at gmail.com> a écrit :
>>>Rob asked me to send out this method I've created to see what everyone thinks. I call it 'ART' for
>>>Approval, Runoff Tally (in the name of a good acronym). The method works as follows: Voters rank
>>>each candidate 'Good', 'Acceptable', or 'Bad' (like 321). To find the winner you simply add up the
>>>'Acceptable' and 'Good' scores for each candidate and the top two advance, ensuring whoever wins
>>>is amongst the most favorable. Then the winner is selected based on a head-to-head automatic
>>>runoff, higher score on more ballots wins. The condorcet winner wins every time in this method except
>>>when they are not among the most approved. This is the biggest question I have however, I think that
>>>the weight of Approval in this method is stronger than condorcet winning (especially in a method where
>>>head-to-head tie scores are possible). The condorcet loser never wins.
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