[EM] re Burlington

robert bristow-johnson rbj at audioimagination.com
Thu May 30 17:47:32 PDT 2019

---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] re Burlington

From: "Abd ul-Rahman Lomax" <abd at lomaxdesign.com>

Date: Thu, May 30, 2019 4:01 pm

To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com


> Nearly all voters can vote against a candidate, be unwilling to accept

> that candidate as a winner, and the candidate can still be a Condorcet

> winner. This becomes more possible as the candidate set enlarges.


> It is easiest to understand this if all voters truncate, effectively

> equal-ranking all but one bottom.


> Simple example: two voters prefer a single candidate over all others.

> All other voters are divided, voting only to prefer their own favorite,

> each one different. So in every pairwise race, the candidate wins.

> Condorcet is an interesting criterion, but is far from the whole of what

> is desirable.

but, as a general rule for real elections in which the voter participation is in the thousands (or more), if the Condorcet Winner exists and they elect someone else, how do they justify that to voters as a body?  How do you tell voters that more of them voted for A over B than the number that
voted for B over A and yet B gets elected?  Assuming a CW exists, how possibly can the election of B be considered more democratic?

> In traditional voting, before modern elections, no decision was made

> unless a majority supported it. Plurality elections discarded that

> principle in the interest of efficiency, which I have been pointing out

> is fascist. If a Condorcet method tests approval of results, and

> requires a majority approving to complete the election, it can avoid the

> problem, but at the risk of failing to complete. It has been common to

> accept the need for "runoff elections."
the commonly cited problem with runoff elections that occur at a later date is that, even in communities with relatively large voter participation, the participation for runoffs is usually around 50% of the number that voted in the
original election.
one of the selling points of RCV (over FPTP with top-two runoff if necessary) is that the election is **decisive** on election day.  people can give their contingency vote on election day as to whom they would vote for in a runoff if their favorite candidate is
eliminated.  i believe this is what motivated the STV procedure of instant runoff voting.

> That could be drastically

> improved by using advanced election methods for both elections, and

> using much more intelligent methods of selecting candidates for a

> runoff. With advanced methods, a Condorcet winner in the primary would

> always advance to the runoff and the issue would be the other one or

> two. And then, again, having approval indication, what should happen if

> no candidate gains majority approval in the runoff? I classic democracy,

> they simply kept on voting until they had majority approval of an outcome.


> On 5/20/2019 2:52 PM, Richard Lung wrote:

>> "But it is only Condorcet that elects the candidate that is explicitly

>> preferred by voters over every other candidate."


>> I wonder tho, whether that satisfies the requiremant for one candidate

>> (of their number) to be prefered over a whole range of candidates?



r b-j                         rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

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