[EM] re Burlington

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

Nearly all voters can vote against a candidate, be unwilling to accept 
that candidate as a winner, and the candidate can still be a Cordorcet 
winner. This becomes more possible as the candidate set enlarges.

It is easiest to understand this if all voters truncate, effectively 
equal-ranking all but one bottom.

Simple example: two voters prefer a single candidate over all others. 
All other voters are divided, voting only to prefer their own favorite, 
each one different. So in every pairwise race, the candidate wins. 
Condorcet is an interesting criterion, but is far from the whole of what 
is desirable.

In traditional voting, before modern elections, no decision was made 
unless a majority supported it. Plurality elections discarded that 
principle in the interest of efficiency, which I have been pointing out 
is fascist. If a Condorcet method tests approval of results, and 
requires a majority approving to complete the election, it can avoid the 
problem, but at the risk of failing to complete. It has been common to 
accept the need for "runoff elections." That could be drastically 
improved by using advanced election methods for both elections, and 
using much more intelligent methods of selecting candidates for a 
runoff. With advanced methods, a Condorcet winner in the primary would 
always advance to the runoff and the issue would be the other one or 
two. And then, again, having approval indication, what should happen if 
no candidate gains majority approval in the runoff? I classic democracy, 
they simply kept on voting until they had majority approval of an outcome.

On 5/20/2019 2:52 PM, Richard Lung wrote:
> "But it is only Condorcet that elects the candidate that is explicitly 
> preferred by voters over every other candidate."
>
> I wonder tho, whether that satisfies the requiremant for one candidate 
> (of their number) to be prefered over a whole range of candidates?
>