[EM] re Burlington
Chris Benham
cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au
Thu May 23 23:40:48 PDT 2019
Richard L,
Why keep the details of your "new version of STV" a secret? Perhaps we
can have a link.
Do you recommend it for single-winner elections?
Do you mean that "FAB STV" complies with Later-no-Harm, or that it
avoids complying with it?
Chris Benham
On 24/05/2019 8:21 am, Richard Lung wrote:
> There's two Richards, one described as Richard F.
> That makes me Richard L.
> Not only have we divergent views (He can speak for himself) but to
> make matters more confusing, I acknowledge the criticism of IRV, STV
> (which Cathy may have picked-up on) but have devised a new version of
> STV (FAB STV) which avoids "premature exclusion" of candidates (as
> well as complying with "later no harm").
>
> from
> Richard Lung.
>
>
> On 22/05/2019 22:40, Kathy Dopp wrote:
>> I just would like to applaud the response below (by Richard?) to those
>> who still support IRV, STV,.. and any other method that tends to
>> eliminate the candidate supported by the most voters in the first
>> round, like it did in Burlington (because IRV, STV, etc. do not treat
>> all voters' votes equally, counting only the 2nd and lower choices of
>> some voters before that candidate is eliminated but not others), and
>> to ask a question:
>>
>> Does approval voting (where each voter may vote for up to n-1
>> candidates when n candidates are running for an office) adhere to the
>> Condorcet criteria?
>>
>> Thank you.
>>
>> Kathy Dopp
>> "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere." - Martin
>> Luther King, Jr.
>>
>> SSRN:http://ssrn.com/author=1451051
>>
>> Science is my passion, politics my duty (Thomas Jefferson, paraphrased)
>>
>> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 12:35 PM
>> <election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com>?? wrote:
>>
>>>> ---------------------------- Original Message
>>>> ----------------------------
>>>> Subject: Re: [EM] re Burlington
>>>> From: "Richard Lung"<voting at ukscientists.com>
>>>> Date: Mon, May 20, 2019 11:52 am
>>>>
>>>> election-methods at electorama.com
>>>>
>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>>
>> ...
>>>> but the Condorcet criterion simply proposes that if more voters mark
>>>> their ballots preferring Candidate A to Candidate B than the number of
>>>> voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not
>>>> elected.
>>>>
>>>> i like to compare it to a mathematical proof by contradiction: If a
>>>> Condorcet Winner exists and your election method does not elect the
>>>> CW, then who did you elect??? You elected someone when more voters
>>>> explicitly marked their ballots that they preferred some other
>>>> **specific** candidate.?? How can that be an expression of the will of
>>>> the electorate??? That's the problem with IRV or Borda or Bucklin (or
>>>> some other RCV that someone cooks up).?? Most of the time it may elect
>>>> the CW.?? Then great! No one is complaining.?? But when it doesn't,
>>>> how
>>>> possibly can the winner claim to have the democratic support of the
>>>> electorate (even though we don't demand a majority of first-choice
>>>> votes, since that demand is unrealistic in a 3-way or 4-way race) when
>>>> the voters explicitly say "Give us this other candidate that we like
>>>> better!" ??
>>>>
>> ...
>>>> L8r,
>>>>
>>>> r b-j
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>> info
>>
>
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