[EM] re Burlington

[Richard Lung]

There's two Richards, one described as Richard F.
That makes me Richard L.
Not only have we divergent views (He can speak for himself) but to make 
matters more confusing, I acknowledge the criticism of IRV, STV (which 
Cathy may have picked-up on) but have devised a new version of STV (FAB 
STV) which avoids "premature exclusion" of candidates (as well as 
complying with "later no harm").

from
Richard Lung.


On 22/05/2019 22:40, Kathy Dopp wrote:
> I just would like to applaud the response below (by Richard?) to those
> who still support IRV, STV,.. and any other method that tends to
> eliminate the candidate supported by the most voters in the first
> round, like it did in Burlington (because IRV, STV, etc. do not treat
> all voters' votes equally, counting only the 2nd and lower choices of
> some voters before that candidate is eliminated but not others), and
> to ask a question:
>
> Does approval voting (where each voter may vote for up to n-1
> candidates when n candidates are running for an office) adhere to the
> Condorcet criteria?
>
> Thank you.
>
> Kathy Dopp
> "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere." - Martin
> Luther King, Jr.
>
> SSRN:http://ssrn.com/author=1451051
>
> Science is my passion, politics my duty (Thomas Jefferson, paraphrased)
>
> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 12:35 PM
> <election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com>  wrote:
>
>>> ---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
>>> Subject: Re: [EM] re Burlington
>>> From: "Richard Lung"<voting at ukscientists.com>
>>> Date: Mon, May 20, 2019 11:52 am
>>>
>>> election-methods at electorama.com
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
> ...
>>> but the Condorcet criterion simply proposes that if more voters mark
>>> their ballots preferring Candidate A to Candidate B than the number of
>>> voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not
>>> elected.
>>>
>>> i like to compare it to a mathematical proof by contradiction: If a
>>> Condorcet Winner exists and your election method does not elect the
>>> CW, then who did you elect??? You elected someone when more voters
>>> explicitly marked their ballots that they preferred some other
>>> **specific** candidate.?? How can that be an expression of the will of
>>> the electorate??? That's the problem with IRV or Borda or Bucklin (or
>>> some other RCV that someone cooks up).?? Most of the time it may elect
>>> the CW.?? Then great! No one is complaining.?? But when it doesn't, how
>>> possibly can the winner claim to have the democratic support of the
>>> electorate (even though we don't demand a majority of first-choice
>>> votes, since that demand is unrealistic in a 3-way or 4-way race) when
>>> the voters explicitly say "Give us this other candidate that we like
>>> better!" ??
>>>
> ...
>>> L8r,
>>>
>>> r b-j
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