[EM] re Burlington

Richard Lung voting at ukscientists.com
Thu May 23 15:51:53 PDT 2019

There's two Richards, one described as Richard F.
That makes me Richard L.
Not only have we divergent views (He can speak for himself) but to make 
matters more confusing, I acknowledge the criticism of IRV, STV (which 
Cathy may have picked-up on) but have devised a new version of STV (FAB 
STV) which avoids "premature exclusion" of candidates (as well as 
complying with "later no harm").

Richard Lung.

On 22/05/2019 22:40, Kathy Dopp wrote:
> I just would like to applaud the response below (by Richard?) to those
> who still support IRV, STV,.. and any other method that tends to
> eliminate the candidate supported by the most voters in the first
> round, like it did in Burlington (because IRV, STV, etc. do not treat
> all voters' votes equally, counting only the 2nd and lower choices of
> some voters before that candidate is eliminated but not others), and
> to ask a question:
> Does approval voting (where each voter may vote for up to n-1
> candidates when n candidates are running for an office) adhere to the
> Condorcet criteria?
> Thank you.
> Kathy Dopp
> "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere." - Martin
> Luther King, Jr.
> SSRN:http://ssrn.com/author=1451051
> Science is my passion, politics my duty (Thomas Jefferson, paraphrased)
> On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 12:35 PM
> <election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com>  wrote:
>>> ---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
>>> Subject: Re: [EM] re Burlington
>>> From: "Richard Lung"<voting at ukscientists.com>
>>> Date: Mon, May 20, 2019 11:52 am
>>> election-methods at electorama.com
>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> ...
>>> but the Condorcet criterion simply proposes that if more voters mark
>>> their ballots preferring Candidate A to Candidate B than the number of
>>> voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not
>>> elected.
>>> i like to compare it to a mathematical proof by contradiction: If a
>>> Condorcet Winner exists and your election method does not elect the
>>> CW, then who did you elect??? You elected someone when more voters
>>> explicitly marked their ballots that they preferred some other
>>> **specific** candidate.?? How can that be an expression of the will of
>>> the electorate??? That's the problem with IRV or Borda or Bucklin (or
>>> some other RCV that someone cooks up).?? Most of the time it may elect
>>> the CW.?? Then great! No one is complaining.?? But when it doesn't, how
>>> possibly can the winner claim to have the democratic support of the
>>> electorate (even though we don't demand a majority of first-choice
>>> votes, since that demand is unrealistic in a 3-way or 4-way race) when
>>> the voters explicitly say "Give us this other candidate that we like
>>> better!" ??
> ...
>>> L8r,
>>> r b-j
> ----
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