[EM] The IRV-Disease has reached my town.

Tue Mar 5 06:29:50 PST 2019

> > What is "reasonable" about it?
>
> finite amount of real-estate on the paper ballot.
>
I can see that as an argument against compelling voters to rank all the
candidates, as happens in most Australian elections, but not for denying
anyone the right to rank as many candidates as they wish.

> yeah, but if a CW exists and, for whatever reason, you do not elect 
> the CW (as what happened to us in Burlington in 2009), you are 
> electing a candidate when **more** of us marked our ballots that we 
> preferred someone else.  that's hardly democratic.
Yes that is arguable and I like Condorcet criterion compliance, but that 
isn't the same as saying there
can be "no advantage" to doing without it.

> IRV and the IRV-Condorcet method I like elects A.
>
> is that IRV-Condorcet the same as STV-BTR?
No. It checks for a CW before the first normal IRV-style elimination and 
if there isn't one does so before each
elimination among remaining candidates and elects the first one it finds.

STV-BTR doesn't have good criterion compliances but I forget the details.

> how would we differentiate that scenario with 44 B>C that was 
> strategic from the same exact set of ballots cast that are sincere?  
> if it's sincere, then B should win.
Because ..??

Chris Benham

On 5/03/2019 7:09 pm, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>
> i am not on the other two lists, so i can't post to them.
>
> ---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
> Subject: Re: [EM] The IRV-Disease has reached my town.
> From: "Chris Benham" <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
> Date: Mon, March 4, 2019 9:45 pm
> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Cc: ApprovalVoting at yahoogroups.com
> RangeVoting at yahoogroups.com
> "robert bristow-johnson" <rbj at audioimagination.com>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> > I am strongly of the view that voters should be allowed to bullet-vote
> > or rank every single candidate or anything in between.
>
> Fine.
>
> >> i think that it is reasonable for the law to assign a fixed number of
> >> ranking levels, but it should be more than 3.
> >
> > What is "reasonable" about it?
>
> finite amount of real-estate on the paper ballot.
>
>
> >
> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingent_vote
> >> The contingent vote differs from the alternative vote
> >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting>which allows for
> >> many rounds of counting, eliminating only one weakest candidate each
> >> round.
> >
> >> in a ranked ballot, what defines an "approved" candidate?  all
> >> unranked candidates are tied for last place on a ballot.  is any
> >> candidate that is ranked at all "approved"?
> > Yes.
> >
> >> that would change and complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot.
> >
> > Arguably "change" somewhat but I don't see how (overly) "complicate".
> > Allowing voters to rank among unapproved
> > candidates makes the method more vulnerable to strategy and a lot more
> > complicated.
>
> it adds rules.  without this addition rank/approval thing, the rules 
> of tabulation are simpler.
>
>
> >> i still see no advantage of any method that is not Condorcet compliant
> >> over one that is.
> >
> > All Condorcet methods are vulnerable to Burial strategy and fail the
> > Favorite Betrayal Criterion.
>
> yeah, but if a CW exists and, for whatever reason, you do not elect 
> the CW (as what happened to us in Burlington in 2009), you are 
> electing a candidate when **more** of us marked our ballots that we 
> preferred someone else.  that's hardly democratic.
>
>
> > As has been pointed out to you on this list before, Margins is
> > especially vulnerable to Burial.
>
> yes it has been pointed out to me.  with anecdotes.  with "suppose 
> this..."
>
> > Suppose sincere is:
> >
> > 46 A
> > 44 B
> > 10 C
> >
> >
> > I hope we are clear that if everyone bullet-votes like this then A is
> > the Condorcet (and every other
> > type of) winner.
> >
> > Supposing this scenario is accurately reflected in the pre-election
> > polls, and so the B voters (perhaps
> > following advice from their party) decide "It looks like we are going to
> > lose to A, maybe something good
> > will happen if we rank C" and so the votes cast are:
> >
> > 46 A
> > 44 B>C
> > 10 C
> >
> > A>B 46-44 (margin=2)     B>C 44-10 (margin=34) C>A 54-46 (margin=8)
> >
> > Now Margins elects B,  rewarding the outrageous Burial strategy.
>
> yup it's the impossible Arrow.
>
> how would we differentiate that scenario with 44 B>C that was 
> strategic from the same exact set of ballots cast that are sincere?  
> if it's sincere, then B should win.
>
> but it's a good example of how, if the election was close and you 
> could convince enough B voters to vote tactically, that it rewards 
> Burial.  but it's still a contrived example.
>
> maybe Winning Votes is better than Margins.  i dunno.
>
> > I can't tolerate any method that elects B in this scenario. Even
> > assuming that all the votes are sincere,
> > B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved" and
> > positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten by A.)
>
> but only very closely beaten by A where it appears that otherwise 
> voters more strongly prefer B over C and C over A.  if the vote is 
> sincere, it looks to me that A is *barely* a plurality winner.
>
> >
> > IRV and the IRV-Condorcet method I like elects A.
>
> is that IRV-Condorcet the same as STV-BTR?
>
>
> > The Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval methods I like elect C.  The
> > B voters "approved" C and they got C.
>
> looks weak to me (a lot more voters prefer B to C).  i think you would 
> have some pitchforks in the street if you gave that election to C.
>
> > If you think it is "reasonable" to restrict the number of "ranking
> > levels" and you want to allow voters to equal-rank
> > and presumably also skip ranking levels, then in my book you are talking
> > about ratings rather than rankings
>
> No.  If it's scoring (or "rating"), the voter must tactically decide 
> how much they will score their second choice.  It doesn't make a 
> difference in ranking.  And every voter's voting power should be equal.
>
> > and you have something that stuffs up IRV or anything similar.
>
> dunno what that means, either.
>
> > But it is fine for Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval or Smith//Top
> > Ratings and several other voting methods I like.
>
> I just want it so that when A is compared to B, that everyone who 
> weighs in on that choice have an equal say (that's One-Person-One-Vote).
>
> And, excepting a cycle (which is an "impossible" mess), I just want it 
> that if more voters mark their ballots preferring A to B than the 
> number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then B is not 
> elected.
>
> Them's are my dogma.  And eliminating obvious tactical burdens from 
> voters follows close behind to this dogma.  Simplicity in voting and 
> tabulation comes next.
>
>
> --
>
> r b-j                         rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info

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