<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<blockquote type="cite">> What is "reasonable" about it?
<p>finite amount of real-estate on the paper ballot.</p>
</blockquote>
I can see that as an argument against compelling voters to rank
all the <br>
candidates, as happens in most Australian elections, but not for
denying<br>
anyone the right to rank as many candidates as they wish.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">yeah, but if a CW exists and, for whatever
reason, you do not elect the CW (as what happened to us in
Burlington in 2009), you are electing a candidate when **more**
of us marked our ballots that we preferred someone else. that's
hardly
democratic.</blockquote>
Yes that is arguable and I like Condorcet criterion compliance,
but that isn't the same as saying there<br>
can be "no advantage" to doing without it.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"> IRV and the IRV-Condorcet method I like
elects A.<br>
<br>
is that IRV-Condorcet the same as STV-BTR?<br>
</blockquote>
No. It checks for a CW before the first normal IRV-style
elimination and if there isn't one does so before each<br>
elimination among remaining candidates and elects the first one it
finds.<br>
<br>
STV-BTR doesn't have good criterion compliances but I forget the
details.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">how would we differentiate that scenario
with 44 B>C that was strategic from the same exact set of
ballots cast that are sincere? if it's sincere, then B should
win.</blockquote>
Because ..??<br>
</p>
<p>Chris Benham<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/03/2019 7:09 pm, robert
bristow-johnson wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:471612344caa55cc5dc84448f49e42c2.squirrel@webmail04.register.com">
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<p>i am not on the other two lists, so i can't post to them.<br>
<br>
---------------------------- Original Message
----------------------------<br>
Subject: Re: [EM] The IRV-Disease has reached my town.<br>
From: "Chris Benham" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au"><cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au></a><br>
Date: Mon, March 4, 2019 9:45 pm<br>
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a><br>
Cc: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com">ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com</a><br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:RangeVoting@yahoogroups.com">RangeVoting@yahoogroups.com</a><br>
"robert bristow-johnson" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com"><rbj@audioimagination.com></a><br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
> I am strongly of the view that voters should be allowed to
bullet-vote<br>
> or rank every single candidate or anything in between.</p>
<p>Fine. </p>
<p> </p>
<p>>> i think that it is reasonable for the law to assign a
fixed number of<br>
>> ranking levels, but it should be more than 3.<br>
><br>
> What is "reasonable" about it? </p>
<p>finite amount of real-estate on the paper ballot.</p>
<p><br>
><br>
> <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingent_vote">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingent_vote</a><br>
>> The contingent vote differs from the alternative vote<br>
>>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting></a>which
allows for<br>
>> many rounds of counting, eliminating only one weakest
candidate each<br>
>> round.<br>
><br>
>> in a ranked ballot, what defines an "approved"
candidate? all<br>
>> unranked candidates are tied for last place on a
ballot. is any<br>
>> candidate that is ranked at all "approved"?<br>
> Yes.<br>
><br>
>> that would change and complicate the meaning of the
ranked ballot.<br>
><br>
> Arguably "change" somewhat but I don't see how (overly)
"complicate".<br>
> Allowing voters to rank among unapproved<br>
> candidates makes the method more vulnerable to strategy and
a lot more<br>
> complicated.</p>
<p>it adds rules. without this addition rank/approval thing, the
rules of tabulation are simpler.</p>
<p><br>
>> i still see no advantage of any method that is not
Condorcet compliant<br>
>> over one that is.<br>
><br>
> All Condorcet methods are vulnerable to Burial strategy and
fail the<br>
> Favorite Betrayal Criterion.</p>
<p>yeah, but if a CW exists and, for whatever reason, you do not
elect the CW (as what happened to us in Burlington in 2009), you
are electing a candidate when **more** of us marked our ballots
that we preferred someone else. that's hardly
democratic.</p>
<p><br>
> As has been pointed out to you on this list before, Margins
is<br>
> especially vulnerable to Burial.</p>
<p>yes it has been pointed out to me. with anecdotes. with
"suppose this..."</p>
<p>> Suppose sincere is:<br>
><br>
> 46 A<br>
> 44 B<br>
> 10 C<br>
><br>
><br>
> I hope we are clear that if everyone bullet-votes like this
then A is<br>
> the Condorcet (and every other<br>
> type of) winner.<br>
><br>
> Supposing this scenario is accurately reflected in the
pre-election<br>
> polls, and so the B voters (perhaps<br>
> following advice from their party) decide "It looks like we
are going to<br>
> lose to A, maybe something good<br>
> will happen if we rank C" and so the votes cast are:<br>
><br>
> 46 A<br>
> 44 B>C<br>
> 10 C<br>
><br>
> A>B 46-44 (margin=2) B>C 44-10 (margin=34)
C>A 54-46 (margin=8)<br>
><br>
> Now Margins elects B, rewarding the outrageous Burial
strategy.</p>
<p>yup it's the impossible Arrow.</p>
<p>how would we differentiate that scenario with 44 B>C that
was strategic from the same exact set of ballots cast that are
sincere? if it's sincere, then B should
win.</p>
<p>but it's a good example of how, if the election was close and
you could convince enough B voters to vote tactically, that it
rewards Burial. but it's still a contrived example.</p>
<p>maybe Winning Votes is better than Margins. i dunno.</p>
<p>> I can't tolerate any method
that elects B in this scenario. Even<br>
> assuming that all the votes are sincere,<br>
> B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved"
and<br>
> positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten by A.)</p>
<p>but only very closely beaten by A where it appears that
otherwise voters more strongly prefer B over C and C over A. if
the vote is sincere, it looks to me that A is *barely* a
plurality winner.<br>
<br>
><br>
> IRV and the IRV-Condorcet method I like elects A.<br>
<br>
is that IRV-Condorcet the same as STV-BTR?<br>
<br>
<br>
> The Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval methods I like
elect C. The<br>
> B voters "approved" C and they got C.</p>
<p>looks weak to me (a lot more voters prefer B to C). i think
you would have some pitchforks in the street if you gave that
election to C.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>> If you think it is "reasonable" to restrict the number of
"ranking<br>
> levels" and you want to allow voters to equal-rank<br>
> and presumably also skip ranking levels, then in my book
you are talking<br>
> about ratings rather than rankings</p>
<p>No. If it's scoring (or "rating"), the voter must tactically
decide how much they will score their second choice. It doesn't
make a difference in ranking. And every voter's voting power
should be equal.<br>
<br>
> and you have something that stuffs up IRV or anything
similar.</p>
<p>dunno what that means, either.</p>
<p>> But it is fine for Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval
or Smith//Top<br>
> Ratings and several other voting methods I like.</p>
<p>I just want it so that when A is compared to B, that everyone
who weighs in on that choice have an equal say (that's
One-Person-One-Vote).</p>
<p>And, excepting a cycle (which is an "impossible" mess), I just
want it that if
more voters mark their ballots preferring A to B than the number
of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then B is not
elected.</p>
<p>Them's are my dogma. And eliminating obvious tactical burdens
from voters follows close behind to this dogma. Simplicity in
voting and tabulation
comes next.</p>
<p><br>
--<br>
<br>
r b-j <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a><br>
<br>
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."<br>
</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<br>
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">----
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://electorama.com/em">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list info
</pre>
</blockquote>
<div id="DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2"><br />
<table style="border-top: 1px solid #D3D4DE;">
<tr>
<td style="width: 55px; padding-top: 13px;"><a href="http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient" target="_blank"><img src="https://ipmcdn.avast.com/images/icons/icon-envelope-tick-green-avg-v1.png" alt="" width="46" height="29" style="width: 46px; height: 29px;" /></a></td>
<td style="width: 470px; padding-top: 12px; color: #41424e; font-size: 13px; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 18px;">Virus-free. <a href="http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient" target="_blank" style="color: #4453ea;">www.avg.com</a>
</td>
</tr>
</table><a href="#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2" width="1" height="1"> </a></div></body>
</html>