[EM] The IRV-Disease has reached my town.

[robert bristow-johnson]

i am not on the other two lists, so i can't post to them.



---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] The IRV-Disease has reached my town.

From: "Chris Benham" <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>

Date: Mon, March 4, 2019 9:45 pm

To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com

Cc: ApprovalVoting at yahoogroups.com

RangeVoting at yahoogroups.com

"robert bristow-johnson" <rbj at audioimagination.com>

--------------------------------------------------------------------------



> I am strongly of the view that voters should be allowed to bullet-vote

> or rank every single candidate or anything in between.
Fine. 
 
>> i think that it is reasonable for the law to assign a fixed number of

>> ranking levels, but it should be more than 3.

>

> What is "reasonable" about it? 
finite amount of real-estate on the paper ballot.


>

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingent_vote

>> The contingent vote differs from the alternative vote

>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting>which allows for

>> many rounds of counting, eliminating only one weakest candidate each

>> round.

>

>> in a ranked ballot, what defines an "approved" candidate?  all

>> unranked candidates are tied for last place on a ballot.  is any

>> candidate that is ranked at all "approved"?

> Yes.

>

>> that would change and complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot.

>

> Arguably "change" somewhat but I don't see how (overly) "complicate".

> Allowing voters to rank among unapproved

> candidates makes the method more vulnerable to strategy and a lot more

> complicated.
it adds rules.  without this addition rank/approval thing, the rules of tabulation are simpler.


>> i still see no advantage of any method that is not Condorcet compliant

>> over one that is.

>

> All Condorcet methods are vulnerable to Burial strategy and fail the

> Favorite Betrayal Criterion.
yeah, but if a CW exists and, for whatever reason, you do not elect the CW (as what happened to us in Burlington in 2009), you are electing a candidate when **more** of us marked our ballots that we preferred someone else.  that's hardly
democratic.

> As has been pointed out to you on this list before, Margins is

> especially vulnerable to Burial.
yes it has been pointed out to me.  with anecdotes.  with "suppose this..."
> Suppose sincere is:

>

> 46 A

> 44 B

> 10 C

>

>

> I hope we are clear that if everyone bullet-votes like this then A is

> the Condorcet (and every other

> type of) winner.

>

> Supposing this scenario is accurately reflected in the pre-election

> polls, and so the B voters (perhaps

> following advice from their party) decide "It looks like we are going to

> lose to A, maybe something good

> will happen if we rank C" and so the votes cast are:

>

> 46 A

> 44 B>C

> 10 C

>

> A>B 46-44 (margin=2)     B>C 44-10 (margin=34)   C>A 54-46 (margin=8)

>

> Now Margins elects B,  rewarding the outrageous Burial strategy.
yup it's the impossible Arrow.
how would we differentiate that scenario with 44 B>C that was strategic from the same exact set of ballots cast that are sincere?  if it's sincere, then B should
win.
but it's a good example of how, if the election was close and you could convince enough B voters to vote tactically, that it rewards Burial.  but it's still a contrived example.
maybe Winning Votes is better than Margins.  i dunno.
> I can't tolerate any method
that elects B in this scenario. Even
> assuming that all the votes are sincere,

> B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved" and

> positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten by A.)
but only very closely beaten by A where it appears that otherwise voters more strongly prefer B over C and C over A.  if the vote is sincere, it looks to me that A is *barely* a plurality winner.



>

> IRV and the IRV-Condorcet method I like elects A.



is that IRV-Condorcet the same as STV-BTR?





> The Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval methods I like elect C.  The

> B voters "approved" C and they got C.
looks weak to me (a lot more voters prefer B to C).  i think you would have some pitchforks in the street if you gave that election to C.
 
> If you think it is "reasonable" to restrict the number of
"ranking
> levels" and you want to allow voters to equal-rank

> and presumably also skip ranking levels, then in my book you are talking

> about ratings rather than rankings
No.  If it's scoring (or "rating"), the voter must tactically decide how much they will score their second choice.  It doesn't make a difference in ranking.  And every voter's voting power should be equal.



> and you have something that stuffs up IRV or anything similar.
dunno what that means, either.
> But it is fine for Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval or Smith//Top

> Ratings and several other voting methods I like.
I just want it so that when A is compared to B, that everyone who weighs in on that choice have an equal say (that's One-Person-One-Vote).
And, excepting a cycle (which is an "impossible" mess), I just want it that if
more voters mark their ballots preferring A to B than the number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then B is not elected.
Them's are my dogma.  And eliminating obvious tactical burdens from voters follows close behind to this dogma.  Simplicity in voting and tabulation
comes next.

--



r b-j                         rbj at audioimagination.com



"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

 
 
 
 
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