<p>i am not on the other two lists, so i can't post to them.<br />
<br />
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------<br />
Subject: Re: [EM] The IRV-Disease has reached my town.<br />
From: "Chris Benham" <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au><br />
Date: Mon, March 4, 2019 9:45 pm<br />
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com<br />
Cc: ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com<br />
RangeVoting@yahoogroups.com<br />
"robert bristow-johnson" <rbj@audioimagination.com><br />
--------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
> I am strongly of the view that voters should be allowed to bullet-vote<br />
> or rank every single candidate or anything in between.</p><p>Fine. </p><p> </p><p>>> i think that it is reasonable for the law to assign a fixed number of<br />
>> ranking levels, but it should be more than 3.<br />
><br />
> What is "reasonable" about it? </p><p>finite amount of real-estate on the paper ballot.</p><p><br />
><br />
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingent_vote<br />
>> The contingent vote differs from the alternative vote<br />
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting>which allows for<br />
>> many rounds of counting, eliminating only one weakest candidate each<br />
>> round.<br />
><br />
>> in a ranked ballot, what defines an "approved" candidate? all<br />
>> unranked candidates are tied for last place on a ballot. is any<br />
>> candidate that is ranked at all "approved"?<br />
> Yes.<br />
><br />
>> that would change and complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot.<br />
><br />
> Arguably "change" somewhat but I don't see how (overly) "complicate".<br />
> Allowing voters to rank among unapproved<br />
> candidates makes the method more vulnerable to strategy and a lot more<br />
> complicated.</p><p>it adds rules. without this addition rank/approval thing, the rules of tabulation are simpler.</p><p><br />
>> i still see no advantage of any method that is not Condorcet compliant<br />
>> over one that is.<br />
><br />
> All Condorcet methods are vulnerable to Burial strategy and fail the<br />
> Favorite Betrayal Criterion.</p><p>yeah, but if a CW exists and, for whatever reason, you do not elect the CW (as what happened to us in Burlington in 2009), you are electing a candidate when **more** of us marked our ballots that we preferred someone else. that's hardly
democratic.</p><p><br />> As has been pointed out to you on this list before, Margins is<br />
> especially vulnerable to Burial.</p><p>yes it has been pointed out to me. with anecdotes. with "suppose this..."</p><p>> Suppose sincere is:<br />
><br />
> 46 A<br />
> 44 B<br />
> 10 C<br />
><br />
><br />
> I hope we are clear that if everyone bullet-votes like this then A is<br />
> the Condorcet (and every other<br />
> type of) winner.<br />
><br />
> Supposing this scenario is accurately reflected in the pre-election<br />
> polls, and so the B voters (perhaps<br />
> following advice from their party) decide "It looks like we are going to<br />
> lose to A, maybe something good<br />
> will happen if we rank C" and so the votes cast are:<br />
><br />
> 46 A<br />
> 44 B>C<br />
> 10 C<br />
><br />
> A>B 46-44 (margin=2) B>C 44-10 (margin=34) C>A 54-46 (margin=8)<br />
><br />
> Now Margins elects B, rewarding the outrageous Burial strategy.</p><p>yup it's the impossible Arrow.</p><p>how would we differentiate that scenario with 44 B>C that was strategic from the same exact set of ballots cast that are sincere? if it's sincere, then B should
win.</p><p>but it's a good example of how, if the election was close and you could convince enough B voters to vote tactically, that it rewards Burial. but it's still a contrived example.</p><p>maybe Winning Votes is better than Margins. i dunno.</p><p>> I can't tolerate any method
that elects B in this scenario. Even<br />> assuming that all the votes are sincere,<br />
> B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved" and<br />
> positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten by A.)</p><p>but only very closely beaten by A where it appears that otherwise voters more strongly prefer B over C and C over A. if the vote is sincere, it looks to me that A is *barely* a plurality winner.<br />
<br />
><br />
> IRV and the IRV-Condorcet method I like elects A.<br />
<br />
is that IRV-Condorcet the same as STV-BTR?<br />
<br />
<br />
> The Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval methods I like elect C. The<br />
> B voters "approved" C and they got C.</p><p>looks weak to me (a lot more voters prefer B to C). i think you would have some pitchforks in the street if you gave that election to C.</p><p> </p><p>> If you think it is "reasonable" to restrict the number of
"ranking<br />> levels" and you want to allow voters to equal-rank<br />
> and presumably also skip ranking levels, then in my book you are talking<br />
> about ratings rather than rankings</p><p>No. If it's scoring (or "rating"), the voter must tactically decide how much they will score their second choice. It doesn't make a difference in ranking. And every voter's voting power should be equal.<br />
<br />
> and you have something that stuffs up IRV or anything similar.</p><p>dunno what that means, either.</p><p>> But it is fine for Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval or Smith//Top<br />
> Ratings and several other voting methods I like.</p><p>I just want it so that when A is compared to B, that everyone who weighs in on that choice have an equal say (that's One-Person-One-Vote).</p><p>And, excepting a cycle (which is an "impossible" mess), I just want it that if
more voters mark their ballots preferring A to B than the number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then B is not elected.</p><p>Them's are my dogma. And eliminating obvious tactical burdens from voters follows close behind to this dogma. Simplicity in voting and tabulation
comes next.</p><p><br />--<br />
<br />
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com<br />
<br />
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."<br />
</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p>