[EM] Best-Single Method-MJ

[robert bristow-johnson]

---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] Best-Single Method-MJ

From: "Toby Pereira" <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk>

Date: Fri, June 28, 2019 1:33 pm

To: "robert bristow-johnson" <rbj at audioimagination.com>

Cc: "election-methods at lists.electorama.com" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>

"steve bosworth" <stevebosworth at hotmail.com>

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> On Friday, 28 June 2019, 20:30:33 BST, robert bristow-johnson <rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:

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> ---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

> Subject: Re: [EM] Best-Single Method-MJ

>

From: "Toby Pereira" <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk>

> Date: Fri, June 28, 2019 9:33 am

> To: "election-methods at lists.electorama.com" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>

> "steve bosworth" <stevebosworth at hotmail.com>

> --------------------------------------------------------------------------

>

>>> By "utility" I mean basically that every voter has a "happiness" score for each candidate. And these are added up for each candidate to find the utility winner.

>>So, Toby, just to be clear.  If I really, really, really like my candidate and you just  sortaprefer your candidate, does my vote count for more than your vote?

> Well it partly depends on how you define a vote counting for more. But if these are the two frontrunners, then under a raw utility method, then yes, your vote would count for more. But there isn't a method that reads our minds to judge what we would consider to be our utility of each candidate.
Under score voting, we would both have the choice of how to score these candidates. I can still maximise the difference if I want, but then I understand that you would counter that I am placed with a tactical burden while doing this.
> I don't think the problems of score are as bad as you think they are, but I'm not wedded to it either. One could make a big thing about Condorcet methods (and probably virtually all methods discussed on here) failing participation. Never mind someone's vote counting for more than mine - my vote
might count negative!
 
but a situation that would cause non-monotonicity (where your political interests are better served by your not voting)  has to be a pretty strange situation similar to some of the thought experiments you guys cook up here.  i think it would be completely normal, in a partisan
situation, that people will strategically pick the candidate having any hope of winning that is the least undesirable.  then they will "bullet-score" that candidate and Score Voting becomes essentially FPTP scaled by 5 or 10.  Or if Approval, they will "approve" only
that candidate and no one else making this essentially FPTP.

--



r b-j                         rbj at audioimagination.com



"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

 
 
 
 
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