[EM] Best-Single Method-MJ

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at t-online.de
Sat Jun 29 00:32:11 PDT 2019

On 29/06/2019 00.23, robert bristow-johnson wrote:

> but a situation that would cause non-monotonicity (where your political
> interests are better served by your not voting)  has to be a pretty
> strange situation similar to some of the thought experiments you guys
> cook up here.  i think it would be completely normal, in a partisan
> situation, that people will strategically pick the candidate having any
> hope of winning that is the least undesirable.  then they will
> "bullet-score" that candidate and Score Voting becomes essentially FPTP
> scaled by 5 or 10.  Or if Approval, they will "approve" only that
> candidate and no one else making this essentially FPTP.

I prefer Condorcet to Approval, but that isn't entirely true. In
Approval, it does you no harm to approve candidates who you prefer to
the least undesirable viable candidate; by doing so, you may show,
through the results, that someone everybody thought was unviable is
starting to become viable.

For instance, if you like the Green and Democratic parties, and prefer
the former to the latter, you may vote {G, D} or {G}. There's no reason
to vote only {D}.

The burden on the voter comes when G and D are roughly equal in support.
Do you vote G only and risk the Republicans winning instead, or do you
vote G and D and make it impossible for G to overtake D with your vote
alone? A ranked method, of course, has none of this: if you're a honest
voter, you can simply vote G>D>R. Only strategic voters are burdened.

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