[EM] smith/schwartz/landau

robert bristow-johnson rbj at audioimagination.com
Sat Mar 24 21:32:09 PDT 2018

---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] smith/schwartz/landau

From: "Curt" <accounts at museworld.com>

Date: Sat, March 24, 2018 11:30 pm

To: "election-methods at lists.electorama.com" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>



> (In your final paragraphs, I am not sure if you are talking about a candidate other than the Condorcet Winner, or, a candidate from a multi-candidate Smith Set that would (in the case of a cycle) by definition have another candidate that is preferred over it.)

i was referring to the 2009 mayoral race in Burlington Vermont.  IRV was used, but the ballot data was publically available and we could re-tabulate the ballots according to other rules and we discovered that a CW existed and was not the IRV winner (which meant that the CW came in
"third" by IRV reckoning).

there was no cycle.  the Smith set was of size 1.

the CW was the more centrist Democrat

the IRV winner (and election winner) was Prog

the plurality winner (counting first-choice votes) was GOP

so three different candidates all having some claim of legitimacy for office.  but the law was IRV and the Prog won even though the CW beat him by about 5% in a head-to-head.
the next year, the city voters voted to repeal IRV and we have reverted back to Plurality with a runoff if 40%
cannot be obtained.


r b-j                         rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

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