[EM] smith/schwartz/landau
Juho Laatu
juho.laatu at gmail.com
Sun Mar 25 07:05:24 PDT 2018
> On 25 Mar 2018, at 06:30, Curt <accounts at museworld.com> wrote:
> What do you believe the Smith Set signifies? Is it meaningless to you other than something from which a winner should be algorithmically selected?
To me Smith Set is a criterion that in some sense and at first sight looks natural, but on second thought does not cover all possible scenarios well. I mean that if there is a group of candidates that are a unified group, and they beat all others, then yes, one of them should at least in most cases win. This is related to clones. If all the Smith Set candidates can be considered to be clones, then nominating only one of them would probably lead to electing that candidate as a Condorcet Winner.
What are the problems then? One problem is that those Condorcet methods that are based on rankings only, and possibly a pairwise matrix only, can carry only limited information on what the preferences of the voters are. There can be multiple explanations to what the voter preferences might have been. There are scenarios where electing from the Smith Set may not be natural.
Another problem of the Smith Set is that it may look more natural than it is, when one draws the end results (in paper or in one's mind) so that all the Smith Set candidates are at top, and all others below. This drawing technique to some extent hides the defeats within the Smith Set from the eye.
The best I can do to demonstrate these problems is to give you one particular (old) example scenario where selecting the winner outside of the Smith Set seems quite natural. In some extreme situations Smith Set may thus not be the right choice.
17: A > B > d > C
16: A > d > B > C
17: B > C > d > A
16: B > d > C > A
17: C > A > d > B
16: C > d > A > B
This example is a classic strong cycle of A, B and C, with one more candidate (d) added. Candidates A, B and C are not clones since they are not next to each others in the ballots. Candidate d is not in the Smith Set, but is very close to being a Condorcet Winner (2 votes short). Candidates A, B and C are very far from being Condorcet Winners.
BR, Juho
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list