[EM] A few papers on election science I'd like to point out to y'all

Richard Lung voting at ukscientists.com
Mon Feb 5 13:21:23 PST 2018

```Have not noticed any theoretcal advantages, tho not familiar with
Bucklin. As mentioned before, Laplace decided in favor of election
counting the relative importance of preferences, which is why he favored
Borda to Condorcet. (It doesn't look like Bucklin does that, beyond
co-opting a Borda count.) Since then Gregory method has improved on
Borda. And actually the Meek method keep value is a further conceptual
improvement. I have an interest to declare there, because have extended
the use of the keep value, in a Binomial STV, and to which I recently
made a couple of up-dates. So it's considerably changed (complexified!)
from the example I did for Kristofer: now it is: Four Averages Binomial
Single Transferable Vote (FAB STV).

Next day (brushing aside the cobwebs): It occurs to me that by
"theoretically superior," you may be refering to Bucklin uniformity of
method for single and multiple vacancies. If so, Binomial STV (STV^) has
that covered, because  it is a progression from Meek method, extending
the use of keep values, to conduct counts for single vacancies the same
way as multiple vacancies, as Gregory method could not, nor indeed Meek
method itself, from where it left off.

For theorists, who seek general explanations, STV^ fulfills the
requirement of a consistent treatment of both single and multiple vacancies.

The scientific significance of this is that STV^ brings a more powerful
scale of measurement to single vacancies. However single vacancies are
(much) less desirable both from a democratic and a mensural view-point,
lacking "Proportional Representation. The key to democracy." (As the
Hoag and Hallett classic is titled.)

Following Google notation for "to the power of", which is the
circumflex, ^, then notation for Binomial STV is: STV^. The binomial
theorem expands by powers, and this expansion is the (non-commutative)
guide for systematic STV recounts.

start-up Meccano set 0, which this child never got beyond!).
First order Binomial STV is STV^1. (Basic combination of preference
election count and reverse preference or unpreference exclusion count)
Second order is STV^2, and so on. (Recounts based on systematic
qualifications of the previous order results.)

from
Richard Lung.

On 04/02/2018 23:25, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> I meant "theoretically superior". I agree that in practice STV is a
> better proposal — more well-tested, and the theoretical downsides are
> relatively minor.
>
> 2018-02-04 18:04 GMT-05:00 Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com
> <mailto:voting at ukscientists.com>>:
>
>
>     BTV "known on this list for some time now as a superior option to
>     STV." Other systems, including BTV are not so regarded by
>     organisations, like the PRSA and Electoral Reform Society for well
>     over a century. Not to mention Fair Votes USA.
>
>     Richard Lung.
>
>
>
>     On 04/02/2018 19:18, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>     Yes, I believe that many of these references refer to what is
>>     essentially BTV, which has been known on this list for some time
>>     now as a superior option to STV. I'm happy that it's now in the
>>     literature, and don't really care about naming/precedence.
>>
>>     It's my experience that many prop-rep voting methods can be
>>     expressed in terms of an STV backend. PLACE, Dual Member
>>     Proportional, many MMP variants, etc. can all be seen as just
>>     adding options (such as overlapping seats for MMP and DMP,
>>     biproportionality for DMP and PLACE, and partial delegation for
>>     PLACE) on top of STV. You could therefore create new versions of
>>     all of the above by replacing STV with BTV. I think this would be
>>     a small step up — but not worth the additional difficulty of
>>     explanation, in a world that's more used to STV.
>>
>>     2018-02-04 12:22 GMT-05:00 Kristofer Munsterhjelm
>>     <km_elmet at t-online.de <mailto:km_elmet at t-online.de>>:
>>
>>         On 01/29/2018 02:43 PM, Arthur Wist wrote:
>>
>>             Hello,
>>
>>             Sorry in advanced for the huge load of information all at
>>             once, but I think you'll highly likely find the following
>>             quite interesting:
>>
>>             On how people misunderstood the Duggan-Schwartz theorem:
>>             https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.07105
>>             <https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.07105> - Two statements of
>>             the Duggan-Schwartz theorem
>>             https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.07102
>>             <https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.07102> -  Manipulability of
>>             consular election rules
>>
>>             EVERYTHING here:
>>
>>             Some key highlights from that last link above:
>>
>>             https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.07580
>>             <https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.07580> - Achieving
>>             Proportional Representation via Voting [ On which a blog
>>             post exists:
>>             https://medium.com/@haris.aziz/achieving-proportional-representation-2d741871e78
>>             <https://medium.com/@haris.aziz/achieving-proportional-representation-2d741871e78>.
>>             Better than STV and STV derivatives in all criteria? You
>>             decide! ]
>>
>>
>>         >From a cursory look at the latter, that looks like Bucklin
>>         with a STV-style elect-and-reweight system. I wrote some
>>         posts about a vote-management resistant version of Bucklin at
>>         http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-December/001234.html
>>         <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-December/001234.html>
>>         and
>>         http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2017-September/001584.html
>>         <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2017-September/001584.html>,
>>         and found out that the simplest way of breaking a tie when
>>         more than one candidate exceeds a Droop quota is nonmonotonic.
>>
>>         The simplest tiebreak is that when there are multiple
>>         candidates with more than a quota's worth of votes (up to the
>>         rank you're considering), you elect the one with the most
>>         votes. This can be nonmonotone in th following way:
>>
>>         Suppose in the base scenario, A wins by tiebreak, and B has
>>         one vote less at the rank q, so A is elected instead of B. In
>>         a later round, say, q+1, E wins. Then suppose a few voters
>>         who used to rank A>E decides to push E higher.
>>
>>         Then B wins at rank q. If now most of the B voters vote E at
>>         rank q+1, it may happen that the deweighting done to these
>>         voters (since they got what they wanted with B being elected
>>         instead of A) could keep the method from electing E.
>>
>>         E.g. A could be a left-wing candidate, B be a right-wing
>>         candidate, and E a center-right candidate. In the base
>>         scenario, A wins and then the B voters get compensated by
>>         having the center-right candidate win. But when someone
>>         raises E, the method can't detect the left wing support and
>>         so the right-wing candidate wins instead. Afterwards, the
>>         right-wing has drawn weight away from E (due to E not being a
>>         perfect centrist, but instead being center-right), and so E
>>         doesn't win.
>>
>>         Achieving monotonicity in multiwinner rules is rather hard;
>>         it's not obvious how a method could get around the scenario
>>         above without considering later ranks.
>>
>>         I'm not sure if rank-maximality solves the problem above. If
>>         it doesn't, then the above is an example of CM failure but
>>         not RRCM failure.
>>
>>         http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2012-January/094876.html
>>         <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2012-January/094876.html>
>>         and
>>         http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2012-February/095188.html
>>         <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2012-February/095188.html>
>>         for another Bucklin PR method that seemed to be monotone.
>>
>>         It's also unknown whether Schulze STV is monotone, though it
>>         seems to do much better than IRV-type STV in this respect.
>>         And I'd add that there's yet another (very strong) type of
>>         monotonicity not mentioned in the paper as far as I could
>>         see. Call it "all-winners monotonicity" - raising a winner on
>>         some ballot should not replace any of the candidates on the
>>         elected council with anyone ranked lower on that ballot.
>>
>>         (There's a result by Woodall that you can't have all of
>>         LNHelp, LNHarm, mutual majority and monotonicity. Perhaps,
>>         due to the difficulty of stopping the monotonicity failure
>>         scenario above, the equivalent for multiwinner would turn out
>>         to be "you can't have either LNHelp or LNHarm, and both Droop
>>         proportionality and monotonicity"...)
>>
>>         ----
>>         Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
>>         for list info
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>     ----
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>
>
>     --
>     Richard Lung.
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>     <http://www.voting.ukscientists.com>
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--
Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
E-books in epub format:
https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience

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