[EM] A few papers on election science I'd like to point out to y'all

[Jameson Quinn]

I meant "theoretically superior". I agree that in practice STV is a better
proposal — more well-tested, and the theoretical downsides are relatively
minor.

2018-02-04 18:04 GMT-05:00 Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com>:

>
> BTV "known on this list for some time now as a superior option to STV."
> Other systems, including BTV are not so regarded by organisations, like the
> PRSA and Electoral Reform Society for well over a century. Not to mention
> Fair Votes USA.
>
> Richard Lung.
>
>
>
> On 04/02/2018 19:18, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
> Yes, I believe that many of these references refer to what is essentially
> BTV, which has been known on this list for some time now as a superior
> option to STV. I'm happy that it's now in the literature, and don't really
> care about naming/precedence.
>
> It's my experience that many prop-rep voting methods can be expressed in
> terms of an STV backend. PLACE, Dual Member Proportional, many MMP
> variants, etc. can all be seen as just adding options (such as overlapping
> seats for MMP and DMP, biproportionality for DMP and PLACE, and partial
> delegation for PLACE) on top of STV. You could therefore create new
> versions of all of the above by replacing STV with BTV. I think this would
> be a small step up — but not worth the additional difficulty of
> explanation, in a world that's more used to STV.
>
> 2018-02-04 12:22 GMT-05:00 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>:
>
>> On 01/29/2018 02:43 PM, Arthur Wist wrote:
>>
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> Sorry in advanced for the huge load of information all at once, but I
>>> think you'll highly likely find the following quite interesting:
>>>
>>> On how people misunderstood the Duggan-Schwartz theorem:
>>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.07105 - Two statements of the
>>> Duggan-Schwartz theorem
>>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.07102 -  Manipulability of consular election
>>> rules
>>>
>>> EVERYTHING here:
>>> https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ssb0yjUAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate
>>>
>>> Some key highlights from that last link above:
>>>
>>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.07580 - Achieving Proportional
>>> Representation via Voting [ On which a blog post exists:
>>> https://medium.com/@haris.aziz/achieving-proportional-repres
>>> entation-2d741871e78. Better than STV and STV derivatives in all
>>> criteria? You decide! ]
>>>
>>
>> >From a cursory look at the latter, that looks like Bucklin with a
>> STV-style elect-and-reweight system. I wrote some posts about a
>> vote-management resistant version of Bucklin at
>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-elect
>> orama.com/2016-December/001234.html and http://lists.electorama.com/pi
>> permail/election-methods-electorama.com/2017-September/001584.html, and
>> found out that the simplest way of breaking a tie when more than one
>> candidate exceeds a Droop quota is nonmonotonic.
>>
>> The simplest tiebreak is that when there are multiple candidates with
>> more than a quota's worth of votes (up to the rank you're considering), you
>> elect the one with the most votes. This can be nonmonotone in th following
>> way:
>>
>> Suppose in the base scenario, A wins by tiebreak, and B has one vote less
>> at the rank q, so A is elected instead of B. In a later round, say, q+1, E
>> wins. Then suppose a few voters who used to rank A>E decides to push E
>> higher.
>>
>> Then B wins at rank q. If now most of the B voters vote E at rank q+1, it
>> may happen that the deweighting done to these voters (since they got what
>> they wanted with B being elected instead of A) could keep the method from
>> electing E.
>>
>> E.g. A could be a left-wing candidate, B be a right-wing candidate, and E
>> a center-right candidate. In the base scenario, A wins and then the B
>> voters get compensated by having the center-right candidate win. But when
>> someone raises E, the method can't detect the left wing support and so the
>> right-wing candidate wins instead. Afterwards, the right-wing has drawn
>> weight away from E (due to E not being a perfect centrist, but instead
>> being center-right), and so E doesn't win.
>>
>> Achieving monotonicity in multiwinner rules is rather hard; it's not
>> obvious how a method could get around the scenario above without
>> considering later ranks.
>>
>> I'm not sure if rank-maximality solves the problem above. If it doesn't,
>> then the above is an example of CM failure but not RRCM failure.
>>
>> See also http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-elect
>> orama.com/2012-January/094876.html and http://lists.electorama.com/pi
>> permail/election-methods-electorama.com/2012-February/095188.html for
>> another Bucklin PR method that seemed to be monotone.
>>
>> It's also unknown whether Schulze STV is monotone, though it seems to do
>> much better than IRV-type STV in this respect. And I'd add that there's yet
>> another (very strong) type of monotonicity not mentioned in the paper as
>> far as I could see. Call it "all-winners monotonicity" - raising a winner
>> on some ballot should not replace any of the candidates on the elected
>> council with anyone ranked lower on that ballot.
>>
>> (There's a result by Woodall that you can't have all of LNHelp, LNHarm,
>> mutual majority and monotonicity. Perhaps, due to the difficulty of
>> stopping the monotonicity failure scenario above, the equivalent for
>> multiwinner would turn out to be "you can't have either LNHelp or LNHarm,
>> and both Droop proportionality and monotonicity"...)
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
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>
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> Richard Lung.http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
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