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Have not noticed any theoretcal advantages, tho not familiar with
Bucklin. As mentioned before, Laplace decided in favor of election
counting the relative importance of preferences, which is why he
favored Borda to Condorcet. (It doesn't look like Bucklin does
that, beyond co-opting a Borda count.) Since then Gregory method
has improved on Borda. And actually the Meek method keep value is
a further conceptual improvement. I have an interest to declare
there, because have extended the use of the keep value, in a
Binomial STV, and to which I recently made a couple of up-dates.
So it's considerably changed (complexified!) from the example I
did for Kristofer: now it is: Four Averages Binomial Single
Transferable Vote (FAB STV).<br>
<br>
Next day (brushing aside the cobwebs): It occurs to me that by
"theoretically superior," you may be refering to Bucklin
uniformity of method for single and multiple vacancies. If so,
Binomial STV (STV^) has that covered, because it is a progression
from Meek method, extending the use of keep values, to conduct
counts for single vacancies the same way as multiple vacancies, as
Gregory method could not, nor indeed Meek method itself, from
where it left off.<br>
<br>
For theorists, who seek general explanations, STV^ fulfills the
requirement of a consistent treatment of both single and multiple
vacancies.<br>
<br>
The scientific significance of this is that STV^ brings a more
powerful scale of measurement to single vacancies. However single
vacancies are (much) less desirable both from a democratic and a
mensural view-point, lacking "Proportional Representation. The key
to democracy." (As the Hoag and Hallett classic is titled.)<br>
<br>
Following Google notation for "to the power of", which is the
circumflex, ^, then notation for Binomial STV is: STV^. The
binomial theorem expands by powers, and this expansion is the
(non-commutative) guide for systematic STV recounts.<br>
<br>
Traditional (uninomial) STV is STV^0 (zero order STV -- like your
start-up Meccano set 0, which this child never got beyond!).<br>
First order Binomial STV is STV^1. (Basic combination of
preference election count and reverse preference or unpreference
exclusion count)<br>
Second order is STV^2, and so on. (Recounts based on systematic
qualifications of the previous order results.)<br>
<br>
from<br>
Richard Lung.<br>
<br>
On 04/02/2018 23:25, Jameson Quinn wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAO82iZx+a8xGFhK86UodGi2LXvZ1mmjujo7zD=S2_2d4G=wFbA@mail.gmail.com">
<div dir="ltr">I meant "theoretically superior". I agree that in
practice STV is a better proposal — more well-tested, and the
theoretical downsides are relatively minor.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">2018-02-04 18:04 GMT-05:00 Richard Lung
<span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">voting@ukscientists.com</a>></span>:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<div class="m_6475345007026157849moz-cite-prefix"><br>
BTV "known on this list for some time now as a superior
option to STV." Other systems, including BTV are not so
regarded by organisations, like the PRSA and Electoral
Reform Society for well over a century. Not to mention
Fair Votes USA.<br>
<br>
Richard Lung.
<div>
<div class="h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
On 04/02/2018 19:18, Jameson Quinn wrote:<br>
</div>
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</div>
<div>
<div class="h5">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Yes, I believe that many of these
references refer to what is essentially BTV, which
has been known on this list for some time now as a
superior option to STV. I'm happy that it's now in
the literature, and don't really care about
naming/precedence.
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It's my experience that many prop-rep voting
methods can be expressed in terms of an STV
backend. PLACE, Dual Member Proportional, many
MMP variants, etc. can all be seen as just
adding options (such as overlapping seats for
MMP and DMP, biproportionality for DMP and
PLACE, and partial delegation for PLACE) on top
of STV. You could therefore create new versions
of all of the above by replacing STV with BTV. I
think this would be a small step up — but not
worth the additional difficulty of explanation,
in a world that's more used to STV.</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">2018-02-04 12:22
GMT-05:00 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <span
dir="ltr"><<a
href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">km_elmet@t-online.de</a>></span>:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>On 01/29/2018
02:43 PM, Arthur Wist wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px
#ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> Hello,<br>
<br>
Sorry in advanced for the huge load of
information all at once, but I think
you'll highly likely find the following
quite interesting:<br>
<br>
On how people misunderstood the
Duggan-Schwartz theorem:<br>
<a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.07105"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.071<wbr>05</a>
- Two statements of the Duggan-Schwartz
theorem<br>
<a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.07102"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.071<wbr>02</a>
- Manipulability of consular election
rules<br>
<br>
EVERYTHING here:<br>
<a
href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ssb0yjUAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://scholar.google.com/cit<wbr>ations?user=ssb0yjUAAAAJ&sortb<wbr>y=pubdate</a><br>
<br>
Some key highlights from that last link
above:<br>
<br>
<a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.07580"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.075<wbr>80</a>
- Achieving Proportional Representation
via Voting [ On which a blog post exists:
<a
href="https://medium.com/@haris.aziz/achieving-proportional-representation-2d741871e78"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://medium.com/@haris.aziz<wbr>/achieving-proportional-repres<wbr>entation-2d741871e78</a>.
Better than STV and STV derivatives in all
criteria? You decide! ]<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</span> >From a cursory look at the latter,
that looks like Bucklin with a STV-style
elect-and-reweight system. I wrote some posts
about a vote-management resistant version of
Bucklin at <a
href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-December/001234.html"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">http://lists.electorama.com/pi<wbr>permail/election-methods-elect<wbr>orama.com/2016-December/001234<wbr>.html</a>
and <a
href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2017-September/001584.html"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">http://lists.electorama.com/pi<wbr>permail/election-methods-elect<wbr>orama.com/2017-September/00158<wbr>4.html</a>,
and found out that the simplest way of
breaking a tie when more than one candidate
exceeds a Droop quota is nonmonotonic.<br>
<br>
The simplest tiebreak is that when there are
multiple candidates with more than a quota's
worth of votes (up to the rank you're
considering), you elect the one with the most
votes. This can be nonmonotone in th following
way:<br>
<br>
Suppose in the base scenario, A wins by
tiebreak, and B has one vote less at the rank
q, so A is elected instead of B. In a later
round, say, q+1, E wins. Then suppose a few
voters who used to rank A>E decides to push
E higher.<br>
<br>
Then B wins at rank q. If now most of the B
voters vote E at rank q+1, it may happen that
the deweighting done to these voters (since
they got what they wanted with B being elected
instead of A) could keep the method from
electing E.<br>
<br>
E.g. A could be a left-wing candidate, B be a
right-wing candidate, and E a center-right
candidate. In the base scenario, A wins and
then the B voters get compensated by having
the center-right candidate win. But when
someone raises E, the method can't detect the
left wing support and so the right-wing
candidate wins instead. Afterwards, the
right-wing has drawn weight away from E (due
to E not being a perfect centrist, but instead
being center-right), and so E doesn't win.<br>
<br>
Achieving monotonicity in multiwinner rules is
rather hard; it's not obvious how a method
could get around the scenario above without
considering later ranks.<br>
<br>
I'm not sure if rank-maximality solves the
problem above. If it doesn't, then the above
is an example of CM failure but not RRCM
failure.<br>
<br>
See also <a
href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2012-January/094876.html"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">http://lists.electorama.com/pi<wbr>permail/election-methods-elect<wbr>orama.com/2012-January/094876.<wbr>html</a>
and <a
href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2012-February/095188.html"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">http://lists.electorama.com/pi<wbr>permail/election-methods-elect<wbr>orama.com/2012-February/095188<wbr>.html</a>
for another Bucklin PR method that seemed to
be monotone.<br>
<br>
It's also unknown whether Schulze STV is
monotone, though it seems to do much better
than IRV-type STV in this respect. And I'd add
that there's yet another (very strong) type of
monotonicity not mentioned in the paper as far
as I could see. Call it "all-winners
monotonicity" - raising a winner on some
ballot should not replace any of the
candidates on the elected council with anyone
ranked lower on that ballot.<br>
<br>
(There's a result by Woodall that you can't
have all of LNHelp, LNHarm, mutual majority
and monotonicity. Perhaps, due to the
difficulty of stopping the monotonicity
failure scenario above, the equivalent for
multiwinner would turn out to be "you can't
have either LNHelp or LNHarm, and both Droop
proportionality and monotonicity"...)
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Richard Lung.
<a class="m_6475345007026157849moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">http://www.voting.<wbr>ukscientists.com</a>
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<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Richard Lung.
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com">http://www.voting.ukscientists.com</a>
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
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