[EM] Minmax ranked method
robert bristow-johnson
rbj at audioimagination.com
Sun Nov 5 23:02:19 PST 2017
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] Minmax ranked method
From: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" <km_elmet at t-online.de>
Date: Sun, November 5, 2017 3:39 pm
To: rbj at audioimagination.com
"EM" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
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>
> For each potential council, there's a voter that's most displeased with
> having that council elected. A minmax method minimizes how displeased
> this most displeased voter is (which may be a different voter for
> different proposals).
>
> In veto situations, if a minority can say "nope", it's more important
> that no such minority can be annoyed enough that they do so than just
> how annoyed the rest of the voters get.
>
and, for a Smith set of size 3, Minmax picks the same candidate as does Ranked-Pairs (margins) as does Schulze (margins), right? i just wanna make sure i got that right.
so how is the rule worded differently for these three methods in this context of 3 candidates?
--
r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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