[EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

[robert bristow-johnson]

---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

From: fdpk69p6uq at snkmail.com

Date: Fri, June 30, 2017 10:21 pm

To: election-methods at electorama.com

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recalling:
>>>> if i really, really, really like Candidate A over Candidate B and you only>>>> sorta like B over A by just a little bit, it should not matter to what
>>>> disparate degree we like our candidates.
>>>
>>> Yes, it absolutely should.
 
> On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 10:52 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:

>

>

>> that is a fundamental value statement

>> that stands in opposition of the core democratic value that every person's

>> vote should count equally.

>>

>> known as "One-person-one-vote".

>>

>

> No, your "one vote" is your ballot of information about how you feel about

> the candidates, and it has just as much weight as everyone else's.

>
not when the voter finds out that expressing their "true feelings" about the candidates reduces that voter's effectiveness to elect the candidate he/she prefers.


> People use the same argument to campaign against ranked-choice systems, you

> know.

>

> http://www.lifezette.com/polizette/one-man-one-vote-under-assault-in-maine/

>
people can use all sorts of arguments.  doesn't say that the arguments are valid.
 


>

>> and voter 2 will start to resent being vulnerable and honest about things

>> and will learn to be more polemic about things in the future.

>>

>

> Voter 2 will be happy with the results of the election, since they only

> sorta liked B over A a little, anyway.
no, Voter 2 will find out that they didn't get the candidate they preferred **solely** because the other voter was more polarized and got their preference solely because of that polarization.
you are giving Voter 2 a reason (and a burden) for
them to vote tactically to prevent their franchise from being diluted.  Voter 2 (and all of the other voters) will have to think long and hard how highly they want to rate Candidate A (their second choice).

>

>

>> that's the problem with elections gone bad (like Burlington Vermont's IRV

>> of 2009), when voters realize they've been punished for how they voted,

>> there is voter regret and cynicism and people are literally encouraged to

>> be more polarized.

>>

>

> Yes, and utilitarian voting systems reduce polarization by choosing

> moderate candidates that have high approval ratings across the entire

> electorate.

>

> Majoritarian systems choose polarizing candidates who have the support of a

> majority, even if the minority hates them.

>

>> no. the goal of a voting system in a democracy is to determine, reflect,

>> and implement the will of the majority of citizens, all with equal

>> franchise. letting a minority rule sets up all sorts of incentive for

>> strategic voting.

>>

>

> Of course we should not let minorities rule over majorities, but we should

> not let majorities rule over minorities, either.

 
there is a difference between "rule" and "rights".  in a democracy, we **do** let majorities rule, but limit that rule with a well-established foundation of rights for **everyone** including the minority.



but it's **solely** the majority that gets to decide who is elected to office.


> Majoritarianism is a form of tyranny, "might makes right".
no, tyranny and "might makes right" equates *power* with "right".  but the issue is "who rules"?  tyranny does not equate "majority" with "who rules".
 but democracies do.
 
> Single-winner elections should choose the
> candidate who is the best representative of *everyone*, not just a stronger

> faction.
the name we normally use for that "stronger faction" is the majority of the electorate.


>> consider a two-candidate election. it's just between A and B.

>>

>> i don't think you'll get any mileage for the idea that B should be elected

>> when more voters prefer A.

>>

>

> If the electorate would be happier with B winning, then B should be the

> winner, even if a greater number of voters prefer A.
this is the most silly, self-contradicting statement you've made so far.
in a two-candidate race, if more voters prefer A to B, then candidate B should not be elected.
> The preferences are unequal in
strength;
and that means the marked ballots were unequal in strength.  no one wants the strength of their vote diluted.  everyone wants as much franchise as any other.
> arbitrarily assigning equal weight to them is invalid.
it is not arbitrary to assign every voters'
vote equal strength.  it's a very old principle of equality of franchise.
 
>> "Suppose you and a pair of friends are looking to order a pizza. You, and
>> one friend, really like mushrooms, and prefer them over all other vegetable

>> options, but you both also really, really like pepperoni. Your other friend

>> also really likes mushrooms, and prefers them over all other options, but

>> they're also vegetarian. What one topping should you get?
it's not a governmental election.  in life people negotiate and make compromises and self-sacrifice (for the common good) all the time.  but in a democracy, we are all given equal
 
what's gonna
happen with score-voting in governmental elections where the stakes are high is that the polemic supporters and activists will know to max out the effectiveness of their vote (for their candidate) by maxing out their score for their candidate.  the chumps that are told "oh, you can mark
your preferences to whatever degree your heart desires" will find out that they are chumps and that their voice was diluted for marking their ballots sincerely.  they will not repeat that mistake in the following elections.  when everyone (or nearly everyone) bullet rates their
favorite with a "10" and the scores are added, the result is the same as Plurality but scaled up by 10.
the voter is in the polls to represent their *own* political interests.  not someone else's political interests.  Score voting and Approval voting are fundamentally
flawed (for contentious high-stakes governmental elections) because these systems present to the voter an immediate problem for them to decide how they will score (or how they will approve) their second choice and possibly their third choice.  but ranked ballots don't have that
problem.
 

--
r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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