[EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

[fdpk69p6uq at snkmail.com]

On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 10:52 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:

> > ...and even when *everyone* votes tactically, rated systems still
> > outperform ranked systems.
>
> i don't believe it.  and simulations will not persuade me.
>

Well, what would it take to persuade you, then?  I linked to studies of
real people, too.

that is a fundamental value statement
>

Sure


> that stands in opposition of the core democratic value that every person's
> vote should count equally.
>
> known as "One-person-one-vote".
>

No, your "one vote" is your ballot of information about how you feel about
the candidates, and it has just as much weight as everyone else's.

People use the same argument to campaign against ranked-choice systems, you
know.

http://www.lifezette.com/polizette/one-man-one-vote-under-assault-in-maine/


> and voter 2 will start to resent being vulnerable and honest about things
> and will learn to be more polemic about things in the future.
>

Voter 2 will be happy with the results of the election, since they only
sorta liked B over A a little, anyway.


>  that's the problem with elections gone bad (like Burlington Vermont's IRV
> of 2009), when voters realize they've been punished for how they voted,
> there is voter regret and cynicism and people are literally encouraged to
> be more polarized.
>

Yes, and utilitarian voting systems reduce polarization by choosing
moderate candidates that have high approval ratings across the entire
electorate.

Majoritarian systems choose polarizing candidates who have the support of a
majority, even if the minority hates them.

no.  the goal of a voting system in a democracy is to determine, reflect,
> and implement the will of the majority of citizens, all with equal
> franchise.  letting a minority rule sets up all sorts of incentive for
> strategic voting.
>

Of course we should not let minorities rule over majorities, but we should
not let majorities rule over minorities, either.  Majoritarianism is a form
of tyranny, "might makes right".  Single-winner elections should choose the
candidate who is the best representative of *everyone*, not just a stronger
faction.

consider a two-candidate election.  it's just between A and B.
>
> i don't think you'll get any mileage for the idea that B should be elected
> when more voters prefer A.
>

If the electorate would be happier with B winning, then B should be the
winner, even if a greater number of voters prefer A.  The preferences are
unequal in strength; arbitrarily assigning equal weight to them is invalid.

"Suppose you and a pair of friends are looking to order a pizza. You, and
> one friend, really like mushrooms, and prefer them over all other vegetable
> options, but you both also really, really like pepperoni. Your other friend
> also really likes mushrooms, and prefers them over all other options, but
> they're also vegetarian. What one topping should you get?
>
> Clearly the answer is mushrooms, and there is no group of friends worth
> calling themselves such who would conclude otherwise. It's so obvious that
> it hardly seems worth calling attention to. So why is it, that if we put
> this decision up to a vote, do so many election methods, which are
> otherwise seen as perfectly reasonable methods, fail? Plurality, top-two
> runoffs, instant runoff voting, all variations of Condorcet's method, even
> Bucklin voting; all of them, incorrectly, choose pepperoni."


https://leastevil.blogspot.com/2012/03/tyranny-of-majority-weak-preferences.html

We need to stop thinking in terms of "who gets to push around whom", and
start thinking in terms of "what's the best choice for everyone".


On Sat, Jun 24, 2017 at 6:15 PM, Brian Olson wrote:

> Sure, simulations aren't real humans. Opinions stuck in opposition,
> someone ought to do a proper psychology experiment. Devise a methodology,
> do a test, get people to {rank, rate} {5,10, 20} things in a subject they
> {know well, know poorly} and figure out the quality of information gotten
> out of people, and ask them how they felt about how much work they had to
> do to put into this.
>

Well, psychologists do experiments on human opinion regularly.  When they
use a ranked-choice system, they call it an "ipsative" measure.  When a
score-based system (the Likert scale), they call it a "normative" measure.
It's understood that rankings cannot meaningfully be compared between
individuals; only ratings can.


"In summary, one may state that scores originally obtained as ipsative
measures may legitimately be employed only for purposes of intraindividual
comparisons. Normative measures may be employed for either interindividual
or intraindividual comparisons."
http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1971-01501-001

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Likert_scale


I also linked to some studies earlier, showing improved predictive validity
of ratings over rankings.  Ranked-choice ballots tend to be biased by the
order in which the choices are presented, demonstrating that not all of the
forced rankings are meaningful.

"Early Krosnick research ("Maximizing Questionnaire Quality", 1999) saw
ranking questions as having greater predictive validity, but a number of
studies since, include his own later research, show rating questions as
having greater validity (Krosnick, Thomas, and Shaeffer, 2003; Maio, Roese,
Seligman, Katz, 1996)."
http://blog.verint.com/ranking-questions-vs-rating-questions


On Sat, Jun 24, 2017 at 7:12 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:

> i presume that Arrow knew what he was writing about.
>

Well, after mathematically proving that all ranked-choice voting systems
are flawed, Arrow became a fan of score voting, and evaluating voting
systems by their actual outcomes.  :)

*CES: Do you have any particular preferences or ideas as far as how voting
> methods should be evaluated in the future? Or, do you think there are
> certain things we should look at in trying to figure out what voting
> methods we should push?*
>
> Dr. Arrow: Well, I’m a little inclined to think that score systems where
> you categorize in maybe three or four classes probably (in spite of what I
> said about manipulation) is probably the best. And that is to look at the
> outcomes and see if everybody says, “well, that seems intuitively a
> reasonable outcome given the inputs.” And some of these studies have been
> made. In France, [Michel] Balinski has done some studies of this kind which
> seem to give some support to these scoring methods.
>
https://electology.org/podcasts/2012-10-06_kenneth_arrow
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