[EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

robert bristow-johnson rbj at audioimagination.com
Fri Jun 23 09:09:14 PDT 2017








---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

From: "Brian Olson" <bql at bolson.org>

Date: Fri, June 23, 2017 8:35 am

To: "EM" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>

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> I was speaking only of ballots, and and in the abstract that *some* election

> algorithm could take that information and make a good outcome of it.
No, we should not make the voters cook up that information.  all we should ask the voters is "whom do you prefer A or B?"  and "if you can't get your favorite, whom is your next
preference?"

> I don't favor raw Score summation. It's strategy prone.
of course it is.  scoring is strategy prone if you use the scores in *any* algorithm other than simple ranking.  and then don't use scores.  just rank.


>  For choices where

> my honest vote might be [1.0, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.0] I should probably

> vote strategically [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0].
but then you're not helping your first choice beat your second or third choice.


>

> And if you don't like that and the varying vote power depending on how you

> vote: I have a system for you!

> "Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings" (IRNR)

> Each ballot is normalized so that all ballots have the same magnitude.



pfffft!  way too complicated.



> The

> modified ballots are summed, and the choice with the lowest sumarry rating

> is disqualified. Each ballot is then normalized again as if the

> disqualified choice was not there, redistributing the vote across the

> choices in proportion to the original ballot. The new modified ballots are

> summed and the process is repeated until there are two choices remaining

> and one choice wins over the other.

>

> I think this works better with an honest ballot in the case where you like

> some choice more than another 'just a little bit' or by whatever margin.

 
no reason to use that over Condorcet (with a simple method to deal with cycles, ranked-pairs is still a lot easier to explain than Schulze and they pick the same winner if there are 3 in the Smith set, so let's use the simpler method)
 


--
 


r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
 


"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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