[EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

[Richard Lung]

I also have found it hard to believe that Score voting and Approval 
voting are taken seriously.
There is a tradition of cumulative voting in one of the states, that, 
not surprisingly, would not have compared badly with FPTP.
An American political science association uses Approval Voting. I take 
that choice in itself to be a form of strategic voting. Neither looking 
too bad with FPTP, nor looking too good, in the eyes of (gerrymandering) 
politicians.

Richard Lung.


On 23/06/2017 17:09, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>
>
>
> ---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
> Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility 
> theorems paradox.
> From: "Brian Olson" <bql at bolson.org>
> Date: Fri, June 23, 2017 8:35 am
> To: "EM" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> > I was speaking only of ballots, and and in the abstract that *some* 
> election
> > algorithm could take that information and make a good outcome of it.
>
> No, we should not make the voters cook up that information.  all we 
> should ask the voters is "whom do you prefer A or B?"  and "if you 
> can't get your favorite, whom is your next preference?"
>
>
> > I don't favor raw Score summation. It's strategy prone.
>
> of course it is.  scoring is strategy prone if you use the scores in 
> *any* algorithm other than simple ranking.  and then don't use scores. 
>  just rank.
>
>
> >  For choices where
> > my honest vote might be [1.0, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.0] I should probably
> > vote strategically [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0].
>
> but then you're not helping your first choice beat your second or 
> third choice.
>
>
> >
> > And if you don't like that and the varying vote power depending on 
> how you
> > vote: I have a system for you!
> > "Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings" (IRNR)
> > Each ballot is normalized so that all ballots have the same magnitude.
>
> pfffft!  way too complicated.
>
> > The
> > modified ballots are summed, and the choice with the lowest sumarry 
> rating
> > is disqualified. Each ballot is then normalized again as if the
> > disqualified choice was not there, redistributing the vote across the
> > choices in proportion to the original ballot. The new modified 
> ballots are
> > summed and the process is repeated until there are two choices remaining
> > and one choice wins over the other.
> >
> > I think this works better with an honest ballot in the case where 
> you like
> > some choice more than another 'just a little bit' or by whatever margin.
>
> no reason to use that over Condorcet (with a simple method to deal 
> with cycles, ranked-pairs is still a lot easier to explain than 
> Schulze and they pick the same winner if there are 3 in the Smith set, 
> so let's use the simpler method)
>
>
> --
>
>
> r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
>
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info


-- 
Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
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