[EM] (2) No Wasted Votes

[steve bosworth]

From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>

Sent: Sunday, April 2, 2017 9:08 PM

To: steve bosworth

Subject: Re: [EM] (2) No Wasted Votes

On 04/02/2017 10:48 PM, steve bosworth wrote:

>

>

> *From: *Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at t-online.de

>

> *Sent: *Sunday, April 2, 2017 1:00 PM

>

> *To: *steve bosworth; election-methods at lists.electorama.co

>

> *Subject: *Re: [EM](2) No Wasted Votes

>

> On 03/25/2017 05:38 PM, steve bosworth wrote:

>>

> Re: No Wasted Votes >

>

> To Everyone:

>

> Hi Kristofer:

>

> S: Because I want a more complete democracy, I want to explain: “How

> Each Citizen’s Vote Can Fully Count in the Legislature” – no votes

> wasted. Using California’s legislative Assembly as an example, the

> system I call Associational Proportional Representation (APR)

> would allow each citizen to guarantee that their one vote will be added

> to the “weighted vote” in the Assembly of the elected member they trust

> most_. The details of exactly how APR would work in practice are

> explained in the article which I will email to you upon request

> (stevebosworth at hotmail.com). However, please let me briefly describe it

> below. Your feedback would be very much appreciated.

>

> K: I've been very busy of late, so I haven't been able to respond to

> your other mail, but I'd like to note a few things. You could use MJ

> instead of IRV. Since APR prior to weighting is basically "elect

> candidates by IRV a bunch of times", ….

>

> S: Thank you for responding in spite of your other commitments.

> However, it seems that my brief description of APR was not as clear as

> I thought. APR is not IRV used “a bunch of times). Instead, APR elects

> all the winners at one time, and in effect, using the whole state,

> country, or nation as one electoral district. Its special “associational” structure allows this. No matter through which one of

> APR’s “electoral associations” a citizen is voting, she can rank any

> number of any of the candidates running in the whole state, nation, or

> country. I hope the attached article explains exactly how APR works.

> Also attached are the 2 flow charts that may help to clarify how APR

> works. For any reader who will not receive these attachment unless they

> ask for them, the brief description of APR that was included in my

> March 25th post is repeated below but now with the most salient phrases

> underlined. I hope this will be of some help.


S:  Below, I’ll add some [necessary clarifications and my answers in square brackets] to your question:



K:  I can't at the moment read the details, but let's just check if I've got

this right.

Is it right that your method effectively works like this?

- For [APR’s general election of] 650 seats, input the votes for [all the different candidates running to represent each of APR’s official] associations.

- Run IRV and eliminate first preference losers [and later, also some losers who had received some lower preferences transferred to them from previously eliminated candidates] one at a time until only 650 candidates are left [and each citizen’s one vote has been added to the “weighted vote of one of the winning candidates].

- The remaining 650 candidates get weights according to the number of

first [and other] preference votes they have.

[ In the event that none of a citizen’s explicit preference candidates is elected, APR’s ballot allows her to require her first preference but eliminated candidate to transfer her one vote to the elected candidate he believes will represent both her and him most faithfully [e.g. see the article’s Endnotes 3 & 4.  This means that each citizen’s vote is guaranteed to be added to the “weighted vote” of the member in the legislature whose worldview is most probably closest to hers.  Thus, no citizen’s vote is wasted quantitatively or qualitatively.  Using your number of 650, this APR legislature would proportionately represent up to 650 of the most popular worldviews held by the electorate.  To exaggerate, this result would contrast sharply with the largely 650 clones that would probably be elected if MJ were used instead for such a multi-winner election.  (I see this last addition as addressing your following suggestion regarding MJ.]

What I meant by "running IRV a bunch of times" was running the

elimination logic (each IRV round) a bunch of times - until only 650 (or

however many) were left. If I was imprecise, I'm sorry.

The rest should still hold, however. If MJ is better than IRV, then a

multi-winner generalization of MJ (such as my Bucklin methods) should be

better than a multi-winner generalization of IRV [No, I do not yet see how] .



________________________________
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
Sent: Sunday, April 2, 2017 9:08 PM
To: steve bosworth
Subject: Re: [EM] (2) No Wasted Votes

On 04/02/2017 10:48 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
>
>
>  *From: *Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at t-online.de
>
>  *Sent: *Sunday, April 2, 2017 1:00 PM
>
>  *To: *steve bosworth; election-methods at lists.electorama.co
>
> *Subject: *Re: [EM](2) No Wasted Votes
>
>
>
> On 03/25/2017 05:38 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
>
>
>
> Re: No Wasted Votes >
>
>
>
> To Everyone:
>
> Hi Kristofer:
>
>
>
> S: Because I want a more complete democracy, I want to explain: “How
> Each Citizen’s Vote Can Fully Count in the Legislature” – no votes
> wasted.  Using California’s legislative Assembly as an example, the
> system I call  Associational Proportional Representation (APR)
> would_allow each citizen to guarantee that their one vote will be added
> to the “weighted vote”  in the Assembly of the elected member they trust
> most_. The details of exactly how APR would work in practice are
> explained in the article which I will email to you upon request
> (stevebosworth at hotmail.com).  However, please let me briefly describe it
> below. Your feedback would be very much appreciated.
>
>
>
> K: I've been very busy of late, so I haven't been able to respond to
> your other mail, but I'd like to note a few things.  You could use MJ
> instead of IRV. Since APR prior to weighting is basically "elect
> candidates by IRV a bunch of times", ….
>
>
>
> S: Thank you for responding in spite of your other commitments.
>  However, it seems that my brief description of APR was not as clear as
> I thought.  APR is not IRV used “a bunch of times).  Instead, APR elects
> all the winners at one time, and in effect, using the whole state,
> country, or nation as one electoral district. Its special
> “associational” structure allows this.  No matter through which one of
> APR’s “electoral associations” a citizen is voting, she can rank any
> number of any of the candidates running in the whole state, nation, or
> country.  I hope the attached article explains exactly how APR works.
>  Also attached are the 2 flow charts that may help to clarify how APR
> works.  For any reader who will not receive these attachment unless they
> ask for them, the brief description of APR that was included in my
> March  25th post is repeated below but now with the most salient phrases
> underlined.  I hope this will be of some help.

I can't at the moment read the details, but let's just check if I've got
this right.

Is it right that your method effectively works like this?

- For 650 seats, input the votes for the different associations.
- Run IRV and eliminate first preference losers one at a time until only
650 candidates are left.
- The remaining 650 candidates get weights according to the number of
first preference votes they have.

What I meant by "running IRV a bunch of times" was running the
elimination logic (each IRV round) a bunch of times - until only 650 (or
however many) were left. If I was imprecise, I'm sorry.

The rest should still hold, however. If MJ is better than IRV, then a
multiwinner generalization of MJ (such as my Bucklin methods) should be
better than a multiwinner generalization of IRV.
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