[EM] 3-slot Condorcet//Top Ratings

[Jameson Quinn]

Michael: could you define 3-slot ICT in the simplest possible terms? As you
would explain it to an election-method naif?

Thanks,
Jameson

2016-09-25 12:18 GMT-04:00 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>:

> (Commenting farther down:)
>
> On Sep 25, 2016 2:59 AM, "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" <km_elmet at t-online.de>
> wrote:
> >
> > On 09/25/2016 03:08 AM, C.Benham wrote:
> >
> > > So as something that better fits your stated aims, I suggest simply
> > > 3-slot Condorcet//Top.
>
> But 3-Slot ICT meets FBC, & amounts to Approval without chicken-dilemma.
>
> I'd offer it as "Deluxe Approval".
>
> It's my favourite.
>
> I'd advise people to top-rate (only) the very best, closest to then, whom
> they really like & fully trust.
>
> ...& to reserve the middle-rating for candidates who are that good, but
> whose voters they don't trust in what would otherwise be a chicken-dilemma
> situation.
>
> Ratings:
> > >
> > > *Voters give the candidates one of 3 ratings (say Top, Middle, Bottom).
> > > Default rating is bottom-most.
> > > Inferring ranking from these ratings, any candidate that pairwise beats
> > > all the others wins.
> > > Otherwise the candidate with highest Top Ratings score wins.*
> > >
> > > Smith//Top Ratings would be technically a bit better, but  the "Smith
> > > set"  part  would probably make the method harder to explain.
> >
> > Couldn't you get Smith by a Llull-type method without much more
> > additional complexity?
> >
> > Line up the candidates in order of first preferences. Then, starting
> > with the candidate with most first preferences as head of the line,
> > compare the candidate at the head of the line with the one next in line.
> > Whoever loses pairwise to the other is eliminated. Keep going until only
> > one candidate remains.
> >
> > Or does that compromise CD?
>
> Sequential-Pairwise is an easy way to get Smith in show-of-hands voting in
> a meeting.
>
> But it's only for nonstrategic amicable electorates.
>
> Sag the B voters doubt that B will survive it's pairwise comparison with A.
>
> So they insincerely vote some C over A, to eliminate A before it gets to B.
>
> Say you're an A voter. You're now  presentated with  a situation in which
> you must choose between letting B win, or retaliating by insincerely voting
> someone over B to eliminate it, resulting in a win for something much worse.
>
> ...a choice between capitulation, or costly retaliation.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
> > ----
> > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20160925/ef71ba86/attachment.htm>