[EM] 3-slot Condorcet//Top Ratings

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Sun Sep 25 09:18:39 PDT 2016

(Commenting farther down:)

On Sep 25, 2016 2:59 AM, "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" <km_elmet at t-online.de>
> On 09/25/2016 03:08 AM, C.Benham wrote:
> > So as something that better fits your stated aims, I suggest simply
> > 3-slot Condorcet//Top.

But 3-Slot ICT meets FBC, & amounts to Approval without chicken-dilemma.

I'd offer it as "Deluxe Approval".

It's my favourite.

I'd advise people to top-rate (only) the very best, closest to then, whom
they really like & fully trust.

...& to reserve the middle-rating for candidates who are that good, but
whose voters they don't trust in what would otherwise be a chicken-dilemma

> >
> > *Voters give the candidates one of 3 ratings (say Top, Middle, Bottom).
> > Default rating is bottom-most.
> > Inferring ranking from these ratings, any candidate that pairwise beats
> > all the others wins.
> > Otherwise the candidate with highest Top Ratings score wins.*
> >
> > Smith//Top Ratings would be technically a bit better, but  the "Smith
> > set"  part  would probably make the method harder to explain.
> Couldn't you get Smith by a Llull-type method without much more
> additional complexity?
> Line up the candidates in order of first preferences. Then, starting
> with the candidate with most first preferences as head of the line,
> compare the candidate at the head of the line with the one next in line.
> Whoever loses pairwise to the other is eliminated. Keep going until only
> one candidate remains.
> Or does that compromise CD?

Sequential-Pairwise is an easy way to get Smith in show-of-hands voting in
a meeting.

But it's only for nonstrategic amicable electorates.

Sag the B voters doubt that B will survive it's pairwise comparison with A.

So they insincerely vote some C over A, to eliminate A before it gets to B.

Say you're an A voter. You're now  presentated with  a situation in which
you must choose between letting B win, or retaliating by insincerely voting
someone over B to eliminate it, resulting in a win for something much worse.

...a choice between capitulation, or costly retaliation.

Michael Ossipoff

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