[EM] Smith//MMPO

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Thu Sep 22 06:35:30 PDT 2016


On Sep 21, 2016 7:50 PM, "C.Benham" <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:
>
>
> Mike,
>
> You recently wrote:
>>
>> Smith//MMPO has replaced Plain MMPO as an advocacy of mine.
>
>
> Do you still advocate  Smith//MMPO ?

Yes I do. Though it doesn't meet CD, it meets Weak CD.

Evidently MMC-like strategy is incompatible with CD.
>
> It seems very similar to Winning Votes  (MAM, Schulze, River,
Smith//MinMax)...

Yes. If shares their optimally unproblematic strategy.

You continued:

...except less decisive.
(endquote)

It can be decisive. If 2 candidates have the same max  pairwise opposition,
compare their next-largest pairwise opposition...& so on.

You left out a property: Weak CD.

>
> 35 A>B
> 25 B
> 40 C
>
> B>C 60-40,   C>A 40-35,  A>B 35-25.     MPO scores: C60 <  A40 = B40.

A wins.

> WV elects B...

...rewarding defection.

but MMPO gives an A=B tie.

...solved as described above. A wins

You continue:

 B winning fails CD and A winning fails Plurality.

(endquote)

A is the most favorite candidate without majority  pairwise opposition.

If the Plurality Criterion says A shouldn't win, then the Plurality
Criterion is mistaken.

Plurality is a positional criterion. A positional standard won't give the
desired properties.

> Also (like WV) it fails  Mono-switch-plump.

That widely accepted, if wv does it.

> 25 A>B
> 26 B>C
> 23 C>A
> 22 C
> 04 A
>
> C>A  71-29,   A>B  52-26,   B>C  51-49.     MPO scores: C51 < B52 < A71
>
> MMPO  and WV elect  C,  but if  the 4A ballots change to 4C then they
both elect B.
>
> 25 A>B
> 26 B>C
> 23 C>A
> 26 C

Of course, as you know, rank methods have faults like that. Participation
is another example.

Avoid them with Approval.

Michael Ossipoff

> C>A  75-26,   A>B  48-26,   B>C  51-49.     MPO scores: B48 < C51 < A75.
>
> In my view C, being both positionally dominant and uncovered, is the
prettiest winner.
>
> Chris Benham
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20160922/26956099/attachment.htm>


More information about the Election-Methods mailing list