[EM] Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.

[Jameson Quinn]

>
>
>
> C:  Again, I'd be interested in seeing a plausible example of when U/P
>> doesn't elect the Approval winner.
>>
>> Easy.
>> 20: A>>B>C
>> 35: B>A>>C
>> 45: C>>A=B
>>
>> Threshold in approval is >>. In U/P, voters are as expressive as possible.
>>
>
> C: On 3-slot ratings ballots, how are the 20 A supporters able to vote one
> unapproved candidate above the other?
>
>
> On the 3-slot ballots, they vote A>B. On the 2-slot ballots, they vote A.
> These are perfectly consistent.
>
>
> C: But above you are suggesting that U/P somehow uses a both a 2-slot
> ballot and a 3-slot ballot.  Which is it?
>

3 slots. Where and how do I suggest otherwise?


>
> Actually it seems to me that the stripped-down 3-slot version (if default
> rating is "Unacceptable") is actually the same method
> as MTA. "Unacceptable" is just the inverse of "Approved".  Any candidate
> who doesn't get a majority "Unacceptable" score must
> get a majority Approval score.
>
>
Not the same. In MTA, if no candidate is majority preferred and several are
majority approved/acceptable, the most approved wins; in U/P, the most
preferred wins. This is the only difference, aside from secondary issues
like ballot design. I believe U/P is better in this case as it makes a
chicken strategy harder to pull off successfully; a clean cliff rather than
a slippery slope.
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