[EM] Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.

[Jameson Quinn]

2016-09-08 0:52 GMT-04:00 Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>:

> Hi Jameson,
>
> MCA (the one with three slots) has the simpler description surely? If
> there's a majority preferred, elect the most preferred; else elect the most
> approved (least disapproved).
>

Using parallel language to yours, here's U/P:

If there's a majority acceptable (minority unacceptable), elect the one of
those that's most preferred. Else elect the most preferred.

That's 4 words more complicated. You could do it in fewer than 4 extra
words if you really wanted.


> There is another method where you elect the approval winner unless there
> are multiple candidates with a majority, in which case preferred ratings
> break the "tie."
>
> Your earlier message says "The winner is the non-disqualified candidate
> with the most approvals" but I assume this should say "most preferred."
>
> So you are saying if nobody manages to get majority approval, you will
> only be using the top ratings and ignoring "acceptable" ratings? That is
> unusual; my instinct is that if we can't find a majority we should try to
> find votes to get as close as possible. There's a risk that you are
> collecting enough information to permit concluding e.g. that a simultaneous
> approval and Condorcet winner lost.
>

Yes, this is possible. But consider the kind of scenario where it happens:

20: A>B
20: A,B
19: B
2: C>B
39: C

In this case A wins, even though B is approval and Condorcet winner. But I
find this kind of thing very implausible in practice; and if such a
pathology occurred, it would not be a horrible outcome. It's implausible
because the electorate above is bizarrely top-heavy in its ratings; except
for the C>B voters, who could make B win by voting C,B, in view of the fact
that C is a clear loser against A and B.

It's not a horrible outcome because a majority of the electorate is fine
with A, and there are more voters enthusiastic about A than about B.


> I don't see why you are making rules for unmarked candidates if your
> intended advantage is simplicity. I believe you explained why you have this
> to somebody else, so I won't ask you to repeat, but I wonder about the
> effect of the sentence that starts "And second." You're saying that if A
> has majority preferred+acceptable, but is not top two on preferred ratings,
> to count blanks as disapproved in hopes that this might remove A's majority
> approval (or rather, non-disapproval)?
>

No. I'm saying that if the top two preferred are both disqualified, then
all blanks should count as "unacceptable", including for those top two.

Consider a scenario like the following:

48: A>...>B; C?
48: B>...>A; C?
1: A>...>C; B?
3: C>...>A,B

Both A and B are majority disqualified. So all the ? count as unacceptable,
C is disqualified, and A wins. If ? were acceptable, then C would win.

Contrast with:

48: A>...>B; C?
48: B>...>A; C?
1: A>...>C; B?
3: C>...>A; B?

Now, B is not majority disqualified, because the C voters explicitly
dislike A more. The ? count as acceptable, and B wins.


> Aside from the weird Clone-Loser issue in having a top-two rule on a
> ratings ballot,
>

The chances that one faction would go to all the trouble of a clone
campaign simply to get the uncertain advantage of guaranteeing that ?
counts as unacceptable... seems very remote to me.


> it feels a little schizophrenic to me that you really want winners to have
> majority non-disapproval yet do not actually think it indicates a worthy
> candidate.
>

I think that majority explicit non-disapproval does indicate a worthy
candidate; and that majority implicit non-disapproval is better than
majority disapproval IF the candidate achieved sufficient scrutiny (which
we can assume is true for the two frontrunners). But I think that unless we
have evidence that a candidate got scrutinized, majority of combined
unacceptable or didn't-bother-rating is as bad as a majority of
unacceptable.


>
> I tend to think we will be lucky if we can consistently get even one
> majority non-disapproved candidate in elections.
>

I disagree. The people who hate both frontrunners in the current system are
louder than those who are OK with either; and in the current presidential
election, they might well be more numerous; but in the average election, I
think that "either one is acceptable" is more common than we might realize.

In a U/P race with two major candidates, one of those is basically
> guaranteed to get the label penalty in the next race.
>

Note that in the current system, "you lost last time" usually means you
don't get to run again. Gore, Kerry, McCain, Romney... didn't run again
after being nominated. Clinton... waited a cycle. So this rule would mostly
matter only for those who won in a NOTA election (that is, one in which all
candidates had majority unacceptable). I think that there should be some
difference between "won with majority acceptable" and "won despite majority
unacceptable", and that a label penalty that the voters can choose to
ignore is not excessive.


>
> Kevin
>
>
> ------------------------------
> *De :* Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> *À :* EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>;
> electionsciencefoundation <electionscience at googlegroups.com>
> *Envoyé le :* Mercredi 7 septembre 2016 12h59
> *Objet :* Re: [EM] U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
>
> The main advantage of U/P voting over other systems like MJ or MCA is
> simplicity of description. So I'm going to try to describe it as simply as
> possible.
>
> To vote, you rate each person running as "preferred", "acceptable", or
> "unacceptable". You can rate any number at each level.
>
> If more than half of voters rate a person "unacceptable", that person
> can't win, unless the same is true of all the people running. Of those
> remaining, the winner is the one rated "preferred" by the most voters.
>
> If you leave all three ratings blank for a candidate, that usually means
> the same as rating them "acceptable". There are two exceptions. First, if
> you made a mark to rate some candidates "acceptable", then the ones you
> didn't make any mark for are counted as "unacceptable". And second, if the
> two most-preferred candidates both can't win, because more than half of
> voters marked them "unacceptable", then candidates with no mark count as
> "unacceptable". That way, you don't end up letting a weak candidate win by
> mistake.
>
> 2016-09-06 13:17 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>:
>
> I've recently posted a few messages discussing a simple 3-level graded
> Bucklin method:
>
> Ballot: For each candidate, you may rate them “preferred”, “acceptable”,
> or “unacceptable”. Any candidate, including an incumbent, who had gotten
> over 50% "unacceptable" in the prior election would have a note to that
> effect next to their name on the ballot. (In prior messages, I'd suggested
> not allowing them on the ballot. I now think that allowing them on, but
> with a note, would be better.)
>
> Counting: For the current eIection, if some but not all candidates have a
> majority (50%+1) of “unacceptable” votes, then they are disqualified. The
> winner is the non-disqualified candidate with the most approvals.
>
> My new name for the above system is U/P voting. It stands for
> "unacceptable/preferred", and can be pronounced "up voting" for quick
> discussion; or "you pee voting" if necessary to avoid confusion.
>
>
>
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