[EM] Fwd: The Top-Set. Method-Merit.

[Michael Ossipoff]

On Sep 7, 2016 5:54 AM, "C.Benham" <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:
>
> Mike,
>
> What happened to the Michael Ossipoff who coined the Chicken Dilemma
criterion?

I still value, it, which is why I prefer 3-Slot ICT (Deluxe Approval), DA,
& your new TTR MGR to plain Approval.

I consider them Aporoval-versions.

But I realized that chicken dilemma isn't as common as the more ordinary
strategy problems. That changed some of my method-suggestions.

>
> It seems to me that your argument here for Approval applies equally well
to any method that meets FBC and for which
> the voter's  best strategy to elect a member of hir  "top set" is vote
them all equal-top and the rest all equal-bottom
> (and if they all do that the result will be the same as Approval).

Yes, incl 2 good Bucklin versions.
>
> But if some voters are willing to take some strategic risk for the sake
of being more expressive, or they are more certain of
> their ranking than the location of their approval threshold, I don't see
why they shouldn't be indulged.

Yes, that's a good argument for Bucklin with the Approval option.

...especially now, when many might overcomprise in Approval, &/or rival
similar parties don't want to vote eachother equal.

...could even be an argument for MAM.

>
> In view of my sentence before last, I'm puzzled by the inclusion of
"Plain Bucklin" (that doesn't allow equal-ranking) on your
> list of "best rank methods".

True. I prefer the others. But if people want to rank, then Plajn B. is
simpler to propose.

Michael Ossipoff

>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
>
> On 9/7/2016 4:14 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>>
>> For anyone, there exists a set of candidates such that, for that person,
electing from that set is more important than the matter of _which_ member
of that set wins.
>>
>> That is hir "operational top-set".
>>
>> Also, there's a set of candidates who are so close to you that you
perceive them as the very best, whom you really like & completely
trust--what you really want.
>>
>> I'll call that your "best top-set".
>>
>> When I say " top-set " or "favorites", I mean operational top-set, with
the understanding that I suggest that your operational top-set should
consist of your best top-set.
>>
>> ...instead of including some dismal pessimistic compromise like Hillary.
>>
>> Your "bottom-set" consists of everyone who isn't in your top-set.
>>
>> Approval's 2-valued ratings perfectly match the candidates' 2 important
categories (top-set & bottom-set).
>>
>> Approving your top-set maximizes the probability of electing from your
top-set.
>>
>> Approval is the method that asks the relevant question.
>>
>> Based in the above, it _is_ possible to objectively say what the best
method is. It's Approval.
>>
>> Yes, people want to vote not only _for_ their top-set--they want to also
vote _among_  their top-set.
>>
>> In other words, they want it all.
>>
>> That's too much to ask of a voting-system. You'll increase the
probability of electing from your bottom-set.
>>
>> If you're concerned that people will over-compromise in Approval,
remember that, if we ever even have verifiably-counted (and therefore
legitimate) elections--let alone a better voting-system--that would only
happen in a very different world.   ...one in which we'd also have honest,
open, participatory media, free & open public discussion, and a
well-informed e!ectorate.
>>
>> In that world, I suggest that your worry is unfounded.
>>
>> But a choice of proposal must depend on what voters and the proposal
committee or organization demands.
>>
>> And if you want a better voting-system in some municipality, under
current conditions, you might be tempted to use ranking, to achieve
MMC...for something relatively foolproof.
>>
>> But MMC knly benefits voters who are majority-favored.
>>
>> A voter is majority-favored if a majority prefer at least part of hir
top-set to everyone else.
>>
>> Arguably it's more fair without MMC, because it can't be available for
all voters.
>>
>> Also, because strategy is usually different, depending on whether you're
majority-favore, then the safety of your top-set depends on judging whether
you're majority-favored.  If you aren't sure you're majority-favored, you
should assume that you aren't...suggesting that Approval would be better.
>>
>> With a rank-method instead of Approval,  in general, you must accept at
least a somewhat greater probability of electing from your bottom-set.
>>
>> But if you choose ranking, then there's no best. No rank-methods
dominates the others.
>>
>> I suggest that the best rank methods consist of 3 Bucklin versions and
MAM. Which to choose depends on what people insist on, and what kind
offensive and defensive strategy is expected.
>>
>> 3 Bucklin versions:
>>
>> 1. Plain Bucklin:
>>
>> No equal-ranking or skipping.
>>
>> 2. B or A:
>>
>> You can vote Plain Bucklin or Approval
>>
>> 3. ER Bucklin:
>>
>> Equal ranking allowed. No skipping.  ...except that if you equal-rank n
candidates in a round, then the count rule automatically skips n-1 rounds
before giving votes at your next rank.
>>
>> None of those dominates the others. It depends on people's demands,
expected strategy, and on how daring & adventurous voters are.
>>
>> MAM is the method that could offer the safest sincere-order ranking, if
people avoid ranking below the expected CW.
>>
>> That deters burial, which would backfire.
>>
>> In Bucklin, too,  and Approval, it's best to not vote below the expected
sincere CW. But in MAM, doing so is harmless unless burial is attempted.
>>
>> A few merit comparisons are sure, however:
>>
>> MJ is nowhere near as good as the Bucklin versions with MMC and
sufficient rating or ranking levels.
>>
>> MJ advocates obfuscate it & its strategy, for themselves, by their
non-Bucklin wording of it.
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>>
>>
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