[EM] Fwd: The Top-Set. Method-Merit.

[C.Benham]

Mike,

What happened to the Michael Ossipoff who coined the Chicken Dilemma 
criterion?

It seems to me that your argument here for Approval applies equally well 
to any method that meets FBC and for which
the voter's  best strategy to elect a member of hir  "top set" is vote 
them all equal-top and the rest all equal-bottom
(and if they all do that the result will be the same as Approval).

But if some voters are willing to take some strategic risk for the sake 
of being more expressive, or they are more certain of
their ranking than the location of their approval threshold, I don't see 
why they shouldn't be indulged.

In view of my sentence before last, I'm puzzled by the inclusion of 
"Plain Bucklin" (that doesn't allow equal-ranking) on your
list of "best rank methods".

Chris Benham



On 9/7/2016 4:14 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>
> For anyone, there exists a set of candidates such that, for that 
> person, electing from that set is more important than the matter of 
> _which_ member of that set wins.
>
> That is hir "operational top-set".
>
> Also, there's a set of candidates who are so close to youthat you 
> perceive them as the very best, whom you really like & completely 
> trust--what you really want.
>
> I'll call that your "best top-set".
>
> When I say " top-set " or "favorites", I mean operational top-set, 
> with the understanding that I suggest that your operational top-set 
> should consist of your best top-set.
>
> ...instead of including some dismal pessimistic compromise like Hillary.
>
> Your "bottom-set" consists of everyone who isn't in your top-set.
>
> Approval's 2-valued ratings perfectly match the candidates' 2 
> important categories (top-set & bottom-set).
>
> Approving your top-set maximizes the probability of electing from your 
> top-set.
>
> Approval is the method that asks the relevant question.
>
> Based in the above, it _is_ possible to objectively say what the best 
> method is. It's Approval.
>
> Yes, people want to vote not only _for_ their top-set--they want to 
> also vote _among_  their top-set.
>
> In other words, they want it all.
>
> That's too much to ask of a voting-system. You'll increase the 
> probability of electing from your bottom-set.
>
> Ifyou'reconcerned that people will over-compromisein Approval, 
> remember that, if we ever even have verifiably-counted (and therefore 
> legitimate) elections--let alone a better voting-system--that would 
> only happen in a very different world.   ...one in which we'd also 
> have honest, open, participatory media, free & open public discussion, 
> andawell-informede!ectorate.
>
> In that world, I suggest that your worry is unfounded.
>
> But a choice of proposal must depend on what voters and the proposal 
> committee or organization demands.
>
> And if you want a better voting-system in some municipality, under 
> current conditions, you might be tempted to use ranking, to achieve 
> MMC...for something relatively foolproof.
>
> But MMC knly benefits voters who are majority-favored.
>
> A voter is majority-favored if a majority prefer at least part of hir 
> top-set to everyone else.
>
> Arguably it's more fair without MMC, because it can't be available for 
> all voters.
>
> Also, because strategy is usually different, depending on whether 
> you're majority-favore, then the safety of your top-set depends on 
> judging whether you're majority-favored. 
> Ifyouaren'tsureyou'remajority-favored, youshouldassumethatyou 
> aren't...suggesting that Approval would be better.
>
> Witharank-methodinsteadofApproval,  in general, 
> youmustacceptatleastasomewhatgreaterprobabilityofelectingfromyourbottom-set.
>
> But if you choose ranking, then there's no best. No rank-methods 
> dominates the others.
>
> I suggest that the best rank methods consist of 3 Bucklin versions and 
> MAM. Which to choose depends on what people insist on, and what kind 
> offensive and defensive strategy is expected.
>
> 3 Bucklin versions:
>
> 1. Plain Bucklin:
>
> No equal-ranking or skipping.
>
> 2. B or A:
>
> You can vote Plain Bucklin or Approval
>
> 3. ER Bucklin:
>
> Equal ranking allowed. No skipping.  ...except that if you equal-rank 
> n candidates in a round, then the count rule automatically skips n-1 
> rounds before giving votes at your next rank.
>
> None of those dominates the others. It depends on people's demands, 
> expected strategy, and on how daring & adventurous voters are.
>
> MAM is the method that could offer the safest sincere-order ranking, 
> ifpeopleavoidrankingbelowtheexpectedCW.
>
> Thatdetersburial, whichwouldbackfire.
>
> In Bucklin, too, andApproval, it'sbesttonotvotebelowthe 
> expectedsincereCW. ButinMAM, doingsoisharmlessunlessburialisattempted.
>
> A few merit comparisons are sure, however:
>
> MJ is nowhere near as good as the Bucklin versions with MMC and 
> sufficient rating or ranking levels.
>
> MJadvocatesobfuscateit& itsstrategy, for themselves, 
> bytheirnon-Bucklinwordingofit.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
> No virus found in this message.
> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com>
> Version: 2016.0.7752 / Virus Database: 4649/12956 - Release Date: 09/06/16
>

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20160907/07eaa6f4/attachment-0001.htm>