[EM] Fwd: The Top-Set. Method-Merit.

[Janet Robinson]

For anyone, there exists a set of candidates such that, for that person, electing from that set is more important than the matter of _which_ member of that set wins.

That is hir "operational top-set".

Also, there's a set of candidates who are so close to you that you perceive them as the very best, whom you really like & completely trust--what you really want.

I'll call that your "best top-set".

When I say " top-set " or "favorites", I mean operational top-set, with the understanding that I suggest that your operational top-set should consist of your best top-set.

...instead of including some dismal pessimistic compromise like Hillary.

Your "bottom-set" consists of everyone who isn't in your top-set.

Approval's 2-valued ratings perfectly match the candidates' 2 important categories (top-set & bottom-set).

Approving your top-set maximizes the probability of electing from your top-set.

Approval is the method that asks the relevant question.

Based in the above, it _is_ possible to objectively say what the best method is. It's Approval.

Yes, people want to vote not only _for_ their top-set--they want to also vote _among_  their top-set.

In other words, they want it all.

That's too much to ask of a voting-system. You'll increase the probability of electing from your bottom-set.

If you're concerned that people will over-compromise in Approval, remember that, if we ever even have verifiably-counted (and therefore legitimate) elections--let alone a better voting-system--that would only happen in a very different world.   ...one in which we'd also have honest, open, participatory media, free & open public discussion, and a well-informed e!ectorate.

In that world, I suggest that your worry is unfounded.

But a choice of proposal must depend on what voters and the proposal committee or organization demands.
 
And if you want a better voting-system in some municipality, under current conditions, you might be tempted to use ranking, to achieve MMC...for something relatively foolproof.

But MMC knly benefits voters who are majority-favored.

A voter is majority-favored if a majority prefer at least part of hir top-set to everyone else.

Arguably it's more fair without MMC, because it can't be available for all voters.

Also, because strategy is usually different, depending on whether you're majority-favore, then the safety of your top-set depends on judging whether you're majority-favored.  If you aren't sure you're majority-favored, you should assume that you aren't...suggesting that Approval would be better.

With a rank-method instead of Approval,  in general, you must accept at least a somewhat greater probability of electing from your bottom-set.

But if you choose ranking, then there's no best. No rank-methods dominates the others.

I suggest that the best rank methods consist of 3 Bucklin versions and MAM. Which to choose depends on what people insist on, and what kind offensive and defensive strategy is expected.

3 Bucklin versions: 

1. Plain Bucklin:

No equal-ranking or skipping.

2. B or A:

You can vote Plain Bucklin or Approval

3. ER Bucklin:

Equal ranking allowed. No skipping.  ...except that if you equal-rank n candidates in a round, then the count rule automatically skips n-1 rounds before giving votes at your next rank.

None of those dominates the others. It depends on people's demands, expected strategy, and on how daring & adventurous voters are.

MAM is the method that could offer the safest sincere-order ranking, if people avoid ranking below the expected CW.

That deters burial, which would backfire.

In Bucklin, too,  and Approval, it's best to not vote below the expected sincere CW. But in MAM, doing so is harmless unless burial is attempted.

A few merit comparisons are sure, however:

MJ is nowhere near as good as the Bucklin versions with MMC and sufficient rating or ranking levels.

MJ advocates obfuscate it & its strategy, for themselves, by their non-Bucklin wording of it.

Michael Ossipoff
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