[EM] MaxMinPA

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Mon Oct 24 15:37:26 PDT 2016

Even under IUACUA  conditions, Approval would be fine for choosing the
party or candidate. It's only for making particular action-decisions or
maybe policy choices, that D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp would be importantly better.

Michael Ossipoff

On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 6:08 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:

> It seems that if we normalize the disutilities, then we lose the
> advantages of D2, D3, and Rawls over D1, since a voter can cube her own
> utilities to get her ratings for example.   If we don't normalize them then
> the dishonest voter who can make up the biggest disutility wins.  Of
> course, under IUACUA conditions this manipulation would not happen.
> On Chiastic Approval, it shares with Bucklin that ratings strictly above
> and strictly below the level x, can be moved around without affecting the
> result, i.e. it is not sensitive to ratings away from the "approval cutoff"
> found by the method.
> An example where Chiastic Approval gives a different result from MJ or
> ordinary Bucklin is the one we considered earlier in a different context:
> 40: A1, B1, D.9, C0
> 35: B1, C1, D.9, A0
> 25: A1, C1, D.9, B0
> Chiastic Approval sets x at .9 or 90 percent, since  more than 90 percent
> of the ballots rate D at ninety percent.
> Candidate D has 100 percent approval with this approval cutoff, and
> candidate B comes in second with 75 percent approval with this cutoff.
> Bucklin chooses 100 percent as the approval cutoff, since that is the
> highest median score.  Candidate B has the highest approval (75 percent)
> while candidate D has zero approval relative to this cutoff.
> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 2:17 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>> .
>> I neglected to add this:
>> Rawls said that it's best to minimize the greatest disutility,  the
>> disutililty for the person who has the greatest disutility.  I agree.
>> Lets say that, as a method, that's called "Rawls method", or "Rawls".
>> In Forest's example, Rawls chooses candidate D.
>> If we had honest, legitimate elections, and an IUACUA electorate, then
>> Rawls would be my 1st choice for the voting-system. But if Rawls isn't
>> feasible, then I'd suggest one of the other IUACUA methods that I described.
>> Michael Ossipoff
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