[EM] Why I prefer ranked-choice voting to approval voting

Richard Lung voting at ukscientists.com
Sun Oct 16 00:53:35 PDT 2016

JFS Ross followed Laplacein favoring Borda method to Condorcet pairing.

Borda suffers from "later harm:" later preferences count against earlier 
preferences. And there is no way of telling, which weighting by 
mathematical series best approximates the relative importance to which 
voters value their greatest to lesser choices. The harmonic series is 
the happy medium.

Condorcet pairing can be weighted to give accurate relative importance 
but only between two candidates at a time (binary choice).

Weighted Condorcet pairing perhaps can be about as informative as Borda 
method. I once refuted a claim that theorem Arrow was substantiated by 
five different single-member election methods giving five different 
answers, when I substituted weighted Condorcet pairing, for unweighted 
Condorcet pairing, which then agreed with method Borda.(Lol!)

It was not until the coming of method Gregory, for the transfer of 
quota-surplus votes, that a more rational assessment, of relative 
importance of ranked choices than Borda, could be made, in a count, by 
stages, which abides by "later no harm."

Preference voting or ranked choice are essential to direct counts, which 
cannot be conducted in only one stage.

Traditional Single Transferable Vote still suffers from premature 
exclusion of candidates, as do all the worlds official elections, 
especially in single-member elections, which don't allow the Gregory 
method of rationally electing prefered candidates to further seats.

To remedy premature exclusion, my method of Binomial STV complements 
rational election counts with rational exclusion counts (by extending 
Meek method use of keep values, amongst other things).


Richard Lung.

On 15/10/2016 17:33, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> ---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why I prefer ranked-choice voting to approval voting
> From: "C.Benham" <cbenham at adam.com.au>
> Date: Sat, October 15, 2016 11:01 am
> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> >> I want to briefly address another form of ranked voting called
> >> Condorcet voting. Condorcet voting also uses a ranked ballot, but the
> >> votes are counted in a different way.
> >> While Condorcet voting is a great voting method, ...
> >
> > "Condorcet voting" isn't decisive enough to qualify as a "voting
> > method". Condorcet is just a criterion (or a category of methods that
> > meet the criterion).
> >
> > Min-Max Margins, Schulze (Winning Votes), Smith//Approval, "Benham"
> > (check for a CW among remaining candidates before each IRV-style
> > elimination)
> > are all very different methods that happen to meet the Condorcet 
> criterion.
> forgot Tideman (ranked-pairs).
> regarding semantics:  i think that it is loosely appropriate, in 
> discussion here and in discussion among the laity to use the term 
> "Condorcet method" or "Condorcet voting" as any of the 
> Condorcet-compliant methods for the sake of discussion to 
> differentiate ranked-choice methods from each other.  i.e. Condorcet 
> vs. IRV or Condorcet vs. Bucklin or Condorcet vs. Borda .  the 
> different Condorcet-compliant methods potentially differ in outcome 
> only when there is a cycle, which in real elections continues to 
> appear to be a rare occurrence.  not only that, at least when margins 
> are considered and there is only three candidates in the cycle, the 
> outcome of Schulze and Ranked Pairs and Min-Max appear to the same. 
>  so, as rare as cycles are, even rarer in the real world are cycles 
> with a Smith set of more than 3 candidates.  so i think, as long as we 
> may leave the details about what to do about cycles to a future 
> debate, it's an acceptable semantic to use the term "Condorcet method" 
> or "Condorcet voting" in the discussion of RCV.
> that said, i think *any* of these Condorcet methods are far better 
> than IRV because when IRV actually fails to elect the CW (which has 
> happened in reality in a governmental election in 2009), even if 
> voters don't know or understand exactly what went wrong, they know 
> **something** did and Ranked-Choice Voting (in general) is discredited 
> along with IRV.  so also are other voting reforms.  Fairvote doesn't 
> get it and even after the experience of 2009, they push IRV portraying 
> it as the *only* way of reform realizing RCV, which is explicitly 
> dishonest.  and they don't get it that somewhere, sometime again, they 
> will get a skeptical jurisdiction to adopt IRV and when it fails again 
> (which may well happen when there are three equally viable 
> candidates), IRV (and, by dishonest association, RCV) will be again 
> discredited.
> still seems that Condorcet -> Ranked Pairs -> Margins is the simplest, 
> mostly fair (doesn't deviate from Schulze-Margins) method to simply 
> adopt this principle: "When more voters mark their ballots that they 
> prefer Candidate A over Candidate B than the number of voters who 
> prefer the contrary, then Candidate B is not elected."  Who can argue 
> with that??  Whenever Candidate B is elected when more of us wanted 
> Candidate A or Candidate C or someone else, i mean WTF?  how can 
> anyone who believes in majority rule and one-person-one-vote disagree 
> with that?
> --
> r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Richard Lung.
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