<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<br>
<big><big><br>
</big></big><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:WordDocument>
<w:View>Normal</w:View>
<w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom>
<w:Compatibility>
<w:BreakWrappedTables/>
<w:SnapToGridInCell/>
<w:WrapTextWithPunct/>
<w:UseAsianBreakRules/>
</w:Compatibility>
<w:BrowserLevel>MicrosoftInternetExplorer4</w:BrowserLevel>
</w:WordDocument>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if !mso]><object
classid="clsid:38481807-CA0E-42D2-BF39-B33AF135CC4D" id=ieooui></object>
<style>
st1\:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) }
</style>
<![endif]--><o:smarttagtype
namespaceuri="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"
name="place">
<style>
<!--
/* Font Definitions */
@font-face
{font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold";
panose-1:2 15 7 4 3 5 4 3 2 4;
mso-font-charset:0;
mso-generic-font-family:swiss;
mso-font-pitch:variable;
mso-font-signature:3 0 0 0 1 0;}
/* Style Definitions */
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
{mso-style-parent:"";
margin:0cm;
margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-fareast-language:EN-US;}
@page Section1
{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
margin:72.0pt 90.0pt 72.0pt 90.0pt;
mso-header-margin:36.0pt;
mso-footer-margin:36.0pt;
mso-paper-source:0;}
div.Section1
{page:Section1;}
-->
</style><!--[if gte mso 10]>
<style>
/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:"Table Normal";
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-parent:"";
mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0cm;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman";}
</style>
<![endif]-->
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:18.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">JFS Ross followed </span><st1:place><span
style="font-size:18.0pt;font-family: "Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">Laplace</span></st1:place><span
style="font-size:
18.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold""> in
favoring Borda method to
Condorcet pairing.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:18.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">Borda
suffers from “later harm:” later preferences count against
earlier preferences.
And there is no way of telling, which weighting by
mathematical series best
approximates the relative importance to which voters value
their greatest to
lesser choices. The harmonic series is the happy medium.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:18.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold""><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:18.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">Condorcet
pairing can be weighted to give accurate relative importance
but only between
two candidates at a time (binary choice). <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:18.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">Weighted
Condorcet pairing perhaps can be about as informative as Borda
method. I once
refuted a claim that theorem Arrow was substantiated by five
different
single-member election methods giving five different answers,
when I
substituted weighted Condorcet pairing, for unweighted
Condorcet pairing, which
then agreed with method Borda.(Lol!)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:18.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold""><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:18.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">It
was not until the coming of method Gregory, for the transfer
of quota-surplus
votes, that a more rational assessment, of relative importance
of ranked
choices than Borda, could be made, in a count, by stages,
which abides by
“later no harm.” <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:18.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">Preference
voting or ranked choice are essential to direct counts, which
cannot be
conducted in only one stage.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:18.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">Traditional
Single Transferable Vote still suffers from premature
exclusion of candidates,
as do all the worlds official elections, especially in
single-member elections,
which don’t allow the Gregory method of rationally electing
prefered candidates
to further seats.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:18.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">To
remedy premature exclusion, my method of Binomial STV
complements rational
election counts with rational exclusion counts (by extending
Meek method use of
keep values, amongst other things).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:18.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold""><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:18.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">From<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:18.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">Richard
Lung.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</o:smarttagtype><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 15/10/2016 17:33, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:8868cca70dbc1a8727d3c2fdd3f4f560.squirrel@webmail04.register.com"
type="cite">
<p><br>
<br>
---------------------------- Original Message
----------------------------<br>
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I prefer ranked-choice voting to approval
voting<br>
From: "C.Benham" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"><cbenham@adam.com.au></a><br>
Date: Sat, October 15, 2016 11:01 am<br>
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a><br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
><br>
>> I want to briefly address another form of ranked voting
called<br>
>> Condorcet voting. Condorcet voting also uses a ranked
ballot, but the<br>
>> votes are counted in a different way.<br>
>> While Condorcet voting is a great voting method, ...<br>
><br>
> "Condorcet voting" isn't decisive enough to qualify as a
"voting<br>
> method". Condorcet is just a criterion (or a category of
methods that<br>
> meet the criterion).<br>
><br>
> Min-Max Margins, Schulze (Winning Votes), Smith//Approval,
"Benham"<br>
> (check for a CW among remaining candidates before each
IRV-style<br>
> elimination)<br>
> are all very different methods that happen to meet the
Condorcet criterion.</p>
<p>forgot Tideman (ranked-pairs).</p>
<p> </p>
<p>regarding semantics: i think that it is loosely appropriate,
in discussion here and in discussion among the laity to use the
term "Condorcet
method" or "Condorcet voting" as any of the Condorcet-compliant
methods for the sake of discussion to differentiate
ranked-choice methods from each other. i.e. Condorcet vs. IRV
or Condorcet vs. Bucklin or Condorcet vs. Borda . the different
Condorcet-compliant methods
potentially differ in outcome only when there is a cycle, which
in real elections continues to appear to be a rare occurrence.
not only that, at least when margins are considered and there
is only three candidates in the cycle, the outcome of Schulze
and Ranked Pairs and Min-Max appear to the
same. so, as rare as cycles are, even rarer in the real world
are cycles with a Smith set of more than 3 candidates. so i
think, as long as we may leave the details about what to do
about cycles to a future debate, it's an acceptable semantic to
use the term "Condorcet method"
or "Condorcet voting" in the discussion of RCV.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>that said, i think *any* of these Condorcet methods are far
better than IRV because when IRV actually fails to elect the CW
(which has happened in reality in a governmental election in
2009), even if voters don't know or
understand exactly what went wrong, they know **something** did
and Ranked-Choice Voting (in general) is discredited along with
IRV. so also are other voting reforms. Fairvote doesn't get it
and even after the experience of 2009, they push IRV portraying
it as the *only* way of reform
realizing RCV, which is explicitly dishonest. and they don't
get it that somewhere, sometime again, they will get a skeptical
jurisdiction to adopt IRV and when it fails again (which may
well happen when there are three equally viable candidates), IRV
(and, by dishonest association, RCV) will
be again discredited.<br>
</p>
<p>still seems that Condorcet -> Ranked Pairs -> Margins is
the simplest, mostly fair (doesn't deviate from Schulze-Margins)
method to simply adopt this principle: "When more voters mark
their ballots that they prefer Candidate A over Candidate B than
the number of voters who
prefer the contrary, then Candidate B is not elected." Who can
argue with that?? Whenever Candidate B is elected when more of
us wanted Candidate A or Candidate C or someone else, i mean
WTF? how can anyone who believes in majority rule and
one-person-one-vote disagree with
that?</p>
<p> </p>
<p><br>
--</p>
<p>r b-j <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a></p>
<p>"Imagination is more important than knowledge."</p>
<p> </p>
<br>
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<br>
<pre wrap="">----
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://electorama.com/em">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Richard Lung.
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com">http://www.voting.ukscientists.com</a>
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085">https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085</a>
E-books in epub format:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience">https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience</a>
</pre>
</body>
</html>