# [EM] MAM vs Schulze (3-slot Smith//Score)

Sun Oct 9 20:18:24 PDT 2016

```On 10/10/2016 7:43 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
> I want to propose a new Condorcet Method below, but first a simple
> three slot method inspired by Jameson's MAS, but one that truly
> satisfies the Chicken Defense Criterion:
>
> Ballots are scores or ratings on a scale of zero to three.
>
> The Smith candidate with the highest average score wins.

Forest,

What is the "Chicken Defense Criterion"?

Your suggested 3-slot  Smith//Score doesn't meet the  Chicken Dilemma
criterion.

http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion

33: A>B
32: B
34: C

A>B>C>A , all candidates in the Smith set.     0-1-2 Scores: B 97 > C 68
> A 66.

B easily wins, but the Chicken Dilemma criterion specifies that B must
not win.

Chris Benham

> Do I remember correctly that MAM is just Ranked Pairs with a better
> tie breaker?
>
C:  MAM ("Maximum Affirmed Majorities")  is  Ranked Pairs (Winning
Votes) with a specific random-ballot based tie-breaker.

http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Maximize_Affirmed_Majorities
>
> It seems like MAM and Ranked Pairs put in as many defeats as possible
> without creating cycles, but like Juho says do we really need all of
> those defeats to decide the winner?
>
> River recognizes that we just need one defeat for each non-winner. It
> seems to me that the one defeat for each non-winner should be as
> strong as possible, but (having already been eliminated) their other
> defeats don't matter.
>
> I want to propose a new Condorcet Method below, but first a simple
> three slot method inspired by Jameson's MAS, but one that truly
> satisfies the Chicken Defense Criterion:
>
> Ballots are scores or ratings on a scale of zero to three.
>
> The Smith candidate with the highest average score wins.
>
> In other words, the method is Smith//Score (or is it Smith\\Score
> ?).with three slot ballots.
>
> Example:
>
> 49 C
> 27 A>B
> 24 B (sincere is B>A)
>
> With sincere votes A is elected as the only member of Smith.
>
> Under the B faction defection C wins as the Smith candidate with the
> highest Score.
>
> Now, how do we adapt this to general rankings? We assume that equal
> top rankings and equal bottom or multiple truncations are allowed.
>
> For each ballot on which a candidate is ranked above bottom but below
> top that candidte receives one point.  For each ballot on which the
> candidate is ranked top or equal top that candidate receives two points.
>
> The Smith candidate with the greatest number of points wins.
>
> [End of definition]
>
> Note that the method does satisfy CD unlike Smith//ImplicitApproval.
> Jameson's idea of three slot scores makes it work.
>
> How does it do on burial?
>
> Forest
>
>
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>
>
>

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