[EM] MAM vs Schulze (3-slot Smith//Score)

[Forest Simmons]

Chris,

I agree, just give points to the equal top candidates.

Or if more extensive rankings are wanted for the purpose of finding Smith,
use standard ordinal ballots with an extra check box beside each candidate
name.  Check the box iff you want to contribute a point to that candidate
in the point count should she make it into Smith.


On Sun, Oct 9, 2016 at 8:18 PM, C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:

> On 10/10/2016 7:43 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> I want to propose a new Condorcet Method below, but first a simple three
> slot method inspired by Jameson's MAS, but one that truly satisfies the
> Chicken Defense Criterion:
>
> Ballots are scores or ratings on a scale of zero to three.
>
> The Smith candidate with the highest average score wins.
>
>
> Forest,
>
> What is the "Chicken Defense Criterion"?
>
> Your suggested 3-slot  Smith//Score doesn't meet the  Chicken Dilemma
> criterion.
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion
>
> 33: A>B
> 32: B
> 34: C
>
> A>B>C>A , all candidates in the Smith set.     0-1-2  Scores: B 97 > C 68
> > A 66.
>
> B easily wins, but the Chicken Dilemma criterion specifies that B must not
> win.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
> Do I remember correctly that MAM is just Ranked Pairs with a better tie
> breaker?
>
> C:  MAM ("Maximum Affirmed Majorities")  is  Ranked Pairs (Winning Votes)
> with a specific random-ballot based tie-breaker.
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Maximize_Affirmed_Majorities
>
>
> It seems like MAM and Ranked Pairs put in as many defeats as possible
> without creating cycles, but like Juho says do we really need all of those
> defeats to decide the winner?
>
> River recognizes that we just need one defeat for each non-winner. It
> seems to me that the one defeat for each non-winner should be as strong as
> possible, but (having already been eliminated) their other defeats don't
> matter.
>
> I want to propose a new Condorcet Method below, but first a simple three
> slot method inspired by Jameson's MAS, but one that truly satisfies the
> Chicken Defense Criterion:
>
> Ballots are scores or ratings on a scale of zero to three.
>
> The Smith candidate with the highest average score wins.
>
> In other words, the method is Smith//Score (or is it Smith\\Score ?).with
> three slot ballots.
>
> Example:
>
> 49 C
> 27 A>B
> 24 B (sincere is B>A)
>
> With sincere votes A is elected as the only member of Smith.
>
> Under the B faction defection C wins as the Smith candidate with the
> highest Score.
>
> Now, how do we adapt this to general rankings? We assume that equal top
> rankings and equal bottom or multiple truncations are allowed.
>
> For each ballot on which a candidate is ranked above bottom but below top
> that candidte receives one point.  For each ballot on which the candidate
> is ranked top or equal top that candidate receives two points.
>
> The Smith candidate with the greatest number of points wins.
>
> [End of definition]
>
> Note that the method does satisfy CD unlike Smith//ImplicitApproval.
> Jameson's idea of three slot scores makes it work.
>
> How does it do on burial?
>
> Forest
>
>
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