<html>
  <head>
    <meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
  </head>
  <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 10/10/2016 7:43 AM, Forest Simmons
      wrote:<br>
      <blockquote type="cite">I want to propose a new Condorcet Method
        below, but first a simple three slot method inspired by
        Jameson's MAS, but one that truly satisfies the Chicken Defense
        Criterion:<br>
        <br>
        Ballots are scores or ratings on a scale of zero to three.<br>
        <br>
        The Smith candidate with the highest average score wins.</blockquote>
      <br>
      Forest,<br>
      <br>
      What is the "Chicken Defense Criterion"?   <br>
      <br>
      Your suggested 3-slot  Smith//Score doesn't meet the  Chicken
      Dilemma criterion.<br>
      <br>
      <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion</a><br>
      <br>
      33: A>B<br>
      32: B<br>
      34: C<br>
      <br>
      A>B>C>A , all candidates in the Smith set.     0-1-2 
      Scores: B 97 > C 68 > A 66.<br>
      <br>
      B easily wins, but the Chicken Dilemma criterion specifies that B
      must not win.<br>
      <br>
      Chris Benham<br>
      <br>
      <br>
      <br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAP29ondUshALqv+9Yn4iCc8tZK76o9Rjr9k0BZsnfzs1ur3b9A@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div>
          <div>
            <div>
              <div>
                <div>
                  <div>
                    <div>
                      <div>
                        <div>
                          <div>
                            <div>
                              <div>
                                <div>
                                  <div>
                                    <div>
                                      <div>
                                        <div>
                                          <div>Do I remember correctly
                                            that MAM is just Ranked
                                            Pairs with a better tie
                                            breaker?<br>
                                            <br>
                                          </div>
                                        </div>
                                      </div>
                                    </div>
                                  </div>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </div>
                          </div>
                        </div>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </div>
                </div>
              </div>
            </div>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    C:  MAM ("Maximum Affirmed Majorities")  is  Ranked Pairs (Winning
    Votes) with a specific random-ballot based tie-breaker.<br>
    <br>
    <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Maximize_Affirmed_Majorities">http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Maximize_Affirmed_Majorities</a><br>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAP29ondUshALqv+9Yn4iCc8tZK76o9Rjr9k0BZsnfzs1ur3b9A@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">
        <div>
          <div>
            <div>
              <div>
                <div>
                  <div>
                    <div>
                      <div>
                        <div>
                          <div>
                            <div>
                              <div>
                                <div>
                                  <div>
                                    <div>
                                      <div>
                                        <div>
                                          <div><br>
                                          </div>
                                          It seems like MAM and Ranked
                                          Pairs put in as many defeats
                                          as possible without creating
                                          cycles, but like Juho says do
                                          we really need all of those
                                          defeats to decide the winner? 
                                          <br>
                                          <br>
                                          River recognizes that we just
                                          need one defeat for each
                                          non-winner. It seems to me
                                          that the one defeat for each
                                          non-winner should be as strong
                                          as possible, but (having
                                          already been eliminated) their
                                          other defeats don't matter.<br>
                                          <br>
                                        </div>
                                        I want to propose a new
                                        Condorcet Method below, but
                                        first a simple three slot method
                                        inspired by Jameson's MAS, but
                                        one that truly satisfies the
                                        Chicken Defense Criterion:<br>
                                        <br>
                                      </div>
                                      Ballots are scores or ratings on a
                                      scale of zero to three.<br>
                                      <br>
                                    </div>
                                    The Smith candidate with the highest
                                    average score wins.<br>
                                    <br>
                                  </div>
                                  In other words, the method is
                                  Smith//Score (or is it Smith\\Score
                                  ?).with three slot ballots.<br>
                                  <br>
                                </div>
                                Example:<br>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                              49 C<br>
                            </div>
                            27 A>B<br>
                          </div>
                          24 B (sincere is B>A)<br>
                          <br>
                        </div>
                        With sincere votes A is elected as the only
                        member of Smith.<br>
                        <br>
                      </div>
                      Under the B faction defection C wins as the Smith
                      candidate with the highest Score.<br>
                      <br>
                    </div>
                    Now, how do we adapt this to general rankings? We
                    assume that equal top rankings and equal bottom or
                    multiple truncations are allowed.<br>
                    <br>
                  </div>
                  For each ballot on which a candidate is ranked above
                  bottom but below top that candidte receives one
                  point.  For each ballot on which the candidate is
                  ranked top or equal top that candidate receives two
                  points.  <br>
                  <br>
                </div>
                The Smith candidate with the greatest number of points
                wins.<br>
                <br>
              </div>
              [End of definition] <br>
              <br>
            </div>
            Note that the method does satisfy CD unlike
            Smith//ImplicitApproval.  Jameson's idea of three slot
            scores makes it work.<br>
            <br>
          </div>
          How does it do on burial?<br>
          <br>
        </div>
        Forest<br>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">----
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://electorama.com/em">http://electorama.com/em</a> for list info
</pre>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <p class="" avgcert""="" color="#000000" align="left"><br>
      </p>
    </blockquote>
    <p><br>
    </p>
  </body>
</html>