[EM] MAM vs Schulze

[Michael Ossipoff]

No, it wasn't the polygamy poll that I looked at. It only has 5
alternatives.

It was one of the others. I don't know which one.

Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 6, 2016 9:33 AM, "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:

> Chris--
>
> Sure, the only reason to use MAM instead of MinMax is for if there's a
> larger Smith set.
>
> We could propose MinMax, and assure people that the situations where it
> fails MAM's criteria will never happen.
>
> I guess "Don't worry, it will never happen" is what FairVote assured
> people in Burlington.
>
> Is that a good idea?
>
> And so, it's on the assumption that there could be a Smith set with more
> than 3 candidates, that we speak of how MAM & Schulze differ.
>
> So, if it will be rare for them to differ, does that mean that we should
> propose the more complicatedly-worded, elaborately- worded one?
>
> ...the less obviously, naturally and clearly motivated & justified one?
>
> MAM's brief definition just says:
>
> A defeat is affirmed if it isn't the weakest defeat in a cycle whose other
> defeats are affirmed.
>
> Though CIVS never has a top cycle for 1st finisher, it often has them
> farther down in the finishing order.
>
> I've only looked at the Smith-set of one of those: the poll regarding laws
> for bigamy.
>
> It's Smith-set was approaching around 10 when I stopped counting. ( The
> cycle was far down in the finishing order).
>
> Maybe short rankings caused that result, or maybe the 1-D spectrum
> assumption doesn't hold for low finishing positions.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
> Marcus,
>
> Barry Wright writes: "[In the 3-candidate case] Least Worst
> Defeat and Schulze [are] disagreeing on only three elections
> per thousand."
>
>
> In the 3-candidate case, how can "Least Worst Defeat" (aka MinMax ?) and
> Schulze *ever* disagree?
>
> As I understand it, Schulze and MAM  and  River and Smith//MinMax can only
> ever give different winners when
> there are more than three candidates in the Smith set.
>
> That chance of that happening in a real public election is close enough to
> zero, so therefore "MAM versus Shulze"
> strikes me as pointless.
>
> And if it didn't I wouldn't find the argument that one's winner pairwise
> beats the other's a small proportion  of times more
> than vice versa very compelling.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
> On 10/6/2016 4:43 AM, Markus Schulze wrote:
>
> Hallo,
>
> on the other side, the simulations have also shown that
> the worst pairwise defeat of the Schulze winner is usually
> weaker than the worst defeat of the MAM winner.
>
> Norman Petry writes: "Schulze and Smith//PC are in agreement
> on the choice of winner over 90% of the time, regardless of
> the size of the Smith set, whereas Tideman's method diverges
> in its choices as the size of the Smith set increases."
>
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-elect
> orama.com/2000-November/069868.html
> https://www.mail-archive.com/election-methods-list@eskimo.co
> m/msg02310.html
> https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/election-methods-list/co
> nversations/topics/5948
>
> Jobst Heitzig writes: "Note that Beatpath and Plain Condorcet
> are unanimous in all these examples!"
>
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-elect
> orama.com/2004-May/078166.html
> https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/election-methods-list/co
> nversations/messages/14251
>
> Barry Wright writes: "[In the 3-candidate case] Least Worst
> Defeat and Schulze [are] disagreeing on only three elections
> per thousand." "We do notice that Least Worst Defeat and
> Schulze continue to show a very coherent response, agreeing
> in nearly ninety-nine percent of all elections through
> seven candidates."
>
> https://services.math.duke.edu/~bray/Courses/49s-GTD/Senior%
> 20Theses/Barry%20Wright/Barry%20Wright's%20Thesis.pdf
>
> Markus Schulze
>
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