[EM] MAM vs Schulze

[Michael Ossipoff]

It was probably my 23-candidate, 19-party 2016 presidential poll.

By the way, without Bernie, Jill Stein is CWv, beating everyone by  a large
factor.

Trump finished at _bottom_ among the original candidates (the two write-ins
were too recent to have a chance to get much support).

Jill beat Donald by a factor of several to one.

The lowest-finishing socialist best Trump by a factor of 2 to 1.

The lowest finishing socialist beat the highest-finishing Republican by a
factor of 1.5 to 1.

Sampling bias? With Jill finishing 1st & Donald finishing last, will you
say that sampling bias justifies saying that Trump might beat Stein in an
honest election with honest media? That would take rather a lot of sampling
bias.

:^)

...because only some have computers? People who have more money are known
to be more conservative.

Yes, some polls show Hillary beating Jill. In my poll, Hillary finished 5th.

Drastic differences like that must result from different electorates.
..the poll being announced to different people.

...to partisan organizations in particular.

My poll was announced only at the polling website (CIVS), and at Democracy
Chronicles.

...not to any partisan organizations.

Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 6, 2016 10:22 AM, "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:

> No, it wasn't the polygamy poll that I looked at. It only has 5
> alternatives.
>
> It was one of the others. I don't know which one.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
> On Oct 6, 2016 9:33 AM, "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Chris--
>>
>> Sure, the only reason to use MAM instead of MinMax is for if there's a
>> larger Smith set.
>>
>> We could propose MinMax, and assure people that the situations where it
>> fails MAM's criteria will never happen.
>>
>> I guess "Don't worry, it will never happen" is what FairVote assured
>> people in Burlington.
>>
>> Is that a good idea?
>>
>> And so, it's on the assumption that there could be a Smith set with more
>> than 3 candidates, that we speak of how MAM & Schulze differ.
>>
>> So, if it will be rare for them to differ, does that mean that we should
>> propose the more complicatedly-worded, elaborately- worded one?
>>
>> ...the less obviously, naturally and clearly motivated & justified one?
>>
>> MAM's brief definition just says:
>>
>> A defeat is affirmed if it isn't the weakest defeat in a cycle whose
>> other defeats are affirmed.
>>
>> Though CIVS never has a top cycle for 1st finisher, it often has them
>> farther down in the finishing order.
>>
>> I've only looked at the Smith-set of one of those: the poll regarding
>> laws for bigamy.
>>
>> It's Smith-set was approaching around 10 when I stopped counting. ( The
>> cycle was far down in the finishing order).
>>
>> Maybe short rankings caused that result, or maybe the 1-D spectrum
>> assumption doesn't hold for low finishing positions.
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>> Marcus,
>>
>> Barry Wright writes: "[In the 3-candidate case] Least Worst
>> Defeat and Schulze [are] disagreeing on only three elections
>> per thousand."
>>
>>
>> In the 3-candidate case, how can "Least Worst Defeat" (aka MinMax ?) and
>> Schulze *ever* disagree?
>>
>> As I understand it, Schulze and MAM  and  River and Smith//MinMax can
>> only ever give different winners when
>> there are more than three candidates in the Smith set.
>>
>> That chance of that happening in a real public election is close enough
>> to zero, so therefore "MAM versus Shulze"
>> strikes me as pointless.
>>
>> And if it didn't I wouldn't find the argument that one's winner pairwise
>> beats the other's a small proportion  of times more
>> than vice versa very compelling.
>>
>> Chris Benham
>>
>>
>> On 10/6/2016 4:43 AM, Markus Schulze wrote:
>>
>> Hallo,
>>
>> on the other side, the simulations have also shown that
>> the worst pairwise defeat of the Schulze winner is usually
>> weaker than the worst defeat of the MAM winner.
>>
>> Norman Petry writes: "Schulze and Smith//PC are in agreement
>> on the choice of winner over 90% of the time, regardless of
>> the size of the Smith set, whereas Tideman's method diverges
>> in its choices as the size of the Smith set increases."
>>
>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-elect
>> orama.com/2000-November/069868.html
>> https://www.mail-archive.com/election-methods-list@eskimo.co
>> m/msg02310.html
>> https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/election-methods-list/co
>> nversations/topics/5948
>>
>> Jobst Heitzig writes: "Note that Beatpath and Plain Condorcet
>> are unanimous in all these examples!"
>>
>> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-elect
>> orama.com/2004-May/078166.html
>> https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/election-methods-list/co
>> nversations/messages/14251
>>
>> Barry Wright writes: "[In the 3-candidate case] Least Worst
>> Defeat and Schulze [are] disagreeing on only three elections
>> per thousand." "We do notice that Least Worst Defeat and
>> Schulze continue to show a very coherent response, agreeing
>> in nearly ninety-nine percent of all elections through
>> seven candidates."
>>
>> https://services.math.duke.edu/~bray/Courses/49s-GTD/Senior%
>> 20Theses/Barry%20Wright/Barry%20Wright's%20Thesis.pdf
>>
>> Markus Schulze
>>
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