[EM] MAM vs Schulze

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Thu Oct 6 09:33:14 PDT 2016


Chris--

Sure, the only reason to use MAM instead of MinMax is for if there's a
larger Smith set.

We could propose MinMax, and assure people that the situations where it
fails MAM's criteria will never happen.

I guess "Don't worry, it will never happen" is what FairVote assured people
in Burlington.

Is that a good idea?

And so, it's on the assumption that there could be a Smith set with more
than 3 candidates, that we speak of how MAM & Schulze differ.

So, if it will be rare for them to differ, does that mean that we should
propose the more complicatedly-worded, elaborately- worded one?

...the less obviously, naturally and clearly motivated & justified one?

MAM's brief definition just says:

A defeat is affirmed if it isn't the weakest defeat in a cycle whose other
defeats are affirmed.

Though CIVS never has a top cycle for 1st finisher, it often has them
farther down in the finishing order.

I've only looked at the Smith-set of one of those: the poll regarding laws
for bigamy.

It's Smith-set was approaching around 10 when I stopped counting. ( The
cycle was far down in the finishing order).

Maybe short rankings caused that result, or maybe the 1-D spectrum
assumption doesn't hold for low finishing positions.

Michael Ossipoff
Marcus,

Barry Wright writes: "[In the 3-candidate case] Least Worst
Defeat and Schulze [are] disagreeing on only three elections
per thousand."


In the 3-candidate case, how can "Least Worst Defeat" (aka MinMax ?) and
Schulze *ever* disagree?

As I understand it, Schulze and MAM  and  River and Smith//MinMax can only
ever give different winners when
there are more than three candidates in the Smith set.

That chance of that happening in a real public election is close enough to
zero, so therefore "MAM versus Shulze"
strikes me as pointless.

And if it didn't I wouldn't find the argument that one's winner pairwise
beats the other's a small proportion  of times more
than vice versa very compelling.

Chris Benham


On 10/6/2016 4:43 AM, Markus Schulze wrote:

Hallo,

on the other side, the simulations have also shown that
the worst pairwise defeat of the Schulze winner is usually
weaker than the worst defeat of the MAM winner.

Norman Petry writes: "Schulze and Smith//PC are in agreement
on the choice of winner over 90% of the time, regardless of
the size of the Smith set, whereas Tideman's method diverges
in its choices as the size of the Smith set increases."

http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-
electorama.com/2000-November/069868.html
https://www.mail-archive.com/election-methods-list@eskimo.com/msg02310.html
https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/election-methods-list/
conversations/topics/5948

Jobst Heitzig writes: "Note that Beatpath and Plain Condorcet
are unanimous in all these examples!"

http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-
electorama.com/2004-May/078166.html
https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/election-methods-list/
conversations/messages/14251

Barry Wright writes: "[In the 3-candidate case] Least Worst
Defeat and Schulze [are] disagreeing on only three elections
per thousand." "We do notice that Least Worst Defeat and
Schulze continue to show a very coherent response, agreeing
in nearly ninety-nine percent of all elections through
seven candidates."

https://services.math.duke.edu/~bray/Courses/49s-GTD/Senior%20Theses/Barry%
20Wright/Barry%20Wright's%20Thesis.pdf

Markus Schulze

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