[EM] MUMA with runoffs?

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Mon Oct 3 07:22:52 PDT 2016

Alright, but didn't we once decide that a top-2 runoff would spoil
Approval's FBC?

The requirement to get Approval from 40% of the voters, for staying in the
election, seems harmless in that regard.

But does it make it any easier for voters? They must still deal with all of
the candidates in the 1st balloting.

Another possible benefit could be the 1sf balloting could provide
information to inform strategy in the 2nd balloting.

Brams &/or Fishburn suggested a preliminary balloting that wouldn't
eliminate anyone. It's only purpose would be to provide that strategic

But, for that, wouldn't a vote-for-favorite balloting be better?

Maybe a balloting to indicate favorite. If anyone gets majority, S/he wins.
If more than 1 get majority, only they go into the next balloting.

If no majorities, then you could require 40% for the next balloting.

If no 40%, then just elect the highest vote getter.

Anyway, might not that  informational balloting be intentionally
deceptively voted by some?

Maybe adding complications to Approval would only complicate voting.

It would certainly lose Approval's obvious simplicity. From just one
obvious way to count, it would change to one of many possible modifications.

Michael Ossipoff

On Oct 2, 2016 10:31 PM, "Rob Lanphier" <robla at robla.net> wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 2, 2016 at 6:35 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> I like a 1-stage system, whether Approval, Score, 3-Slot ICT (Deluxe
Approval), or Bucklin, etc., or something fancier.
>> Half the cost. ...& it seems to me that, when we discussed it before,
there were other advantages to a 1-stage election.
> We've both been advocates for over 20 years, and I used to be convinced
of the mathematical advantages of a single stage election.  However, now
that we all have witnessed the IRV dynamic in more and more settings (e.g.
Burlington 2009), I think I've become convinced that a 2-stage process has
big advantages for making good decisions in high stakes elections.  It's
good to have a first stage for democratic vetting to weed out dangerously
flawed candidates (and to make it possible for the non-crackpots to rise
above the noise created by the crackpots).
> The trend in user interface design is toward "anticipatory design"[1]
(not overwhelming the user with too many choices).  As advocates, we have
touted the benefits of more choices, but that hasn't helped us.  The
> *  An election can have 1 clear frontrunner ("establishment candidate"),
2 other viable choices, and 5 extremists
> *  The frontrunner can lump his/her opposition in with the extremists,
and occupy "the center"
> *  The viable opposition can't raise any more money than any of the
"extremist" candidates
> *  The voters don't have the mental energy to tell the difference between
a viable choice and an extremist
> *  The frontrunner wins without having to win on merit.
> I'm still not an advocate for IRV, but it's also become clear to me that
some of the problems with IRV in practice aren't with the tally method.
I'm living in San Francisco now, and I'm finding that decision fatigue in
elections is also a problem.  An incumbent has an *enormous* advantage in
the general election with a ranked choice ballot, because the opposition
has a difficult time consolidating around a viable alternative.[2]
> Rob
> [1]:
> [2]:
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