[EM] Alright, burial might be prohibitive problem for wv & MMPO.

[Michael Ossipoff]

Because I like some properties of wv and MMPO, I could try to defend them
by saying that maybe the problem would be so well known that the
CWse-preferrers would never forget to plump, & so the burial would never
work, & so people wouldn't bother.

But no one can really be sure who will be a CWs. Even a little uncertainty
means that there will be mis-estimates, & that burial will sometimes be
rewarded.

...changing the win from buriers' bottom-set to their top-set,  giving them
incentive for burial among their bottom-set.

So wv & MMPO remain doubtful proposals.

It could be argued that a CWs tends to be someone popular, & unlikely to be
in many people's bottom-set.

But we've always had to consider the possibility of a low-favoritness CWs.

And the CWs in the Burlington debacle was least favorite of the top 3.

So maybe a big faction could consider the CWs to be bottom-set.

Of course honest elections & honest media would be a completely different
world, & none of us have any idea what it would be like.

Maybe the current ridiculous disparity of candidate-merit, & the existence
of a bottom-set, is an artifact of our phony elections & media.

Maybe, but, for current conditions, maybe method-choice still has to assume
the unlikely worst.

Michael Ossipoff
On Sep 30, 2016 6:40 PM, "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:

> Chris was right about bottom-end burial being a likely big problem for wv
> & MMPO.
>
> In wv & MMPO, if people rate candidates as top-set & bottom-set, then,
> contrary to what I said, they _won't_ be deterred from burial among their
> bottom-set.   ...because they don't care which of them wins, if they have
> at least some tiny chance of defeating them all...as they could if the
> CWs's voters ever forget to plump, or misjudge who's CWs. (If the CWs is in
> their bottom-set).
>
> If so, then maybe burial could be so rampant that the CWs would rarely win.
>
> ..a mess.
>
> Bucklin & Approval (including 3-Slot ICT as an Approval-version) have a
> simplicity, solidity & reliability that pairwise-count unlimited-rank
> methods don't have.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
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