[EM] Symmetric ICT reformulation and exploration

Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Tue Nov 15 12:10:18 PST 2016


Combining Candidate Withdrawal with Candidate Transfer:

When a candidate withdraws, hir votes are distributed in accordance with
the additional preferences of hir supporters.  When no additional
preferences are specified, it is assumed that the voter supports the
preference order of the withdrawing candidate.

Voters may place NOTB (none of the below) above their truncated
candidates.  If at any stage the NOTB candidate accumulates more than
two-thirds (say) of the votes, the election is scuttled and new candidates
must be nominated.

On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 9:55 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> But, even if that rule were extended to rescue a CWv that's farther down
> in the rankings  I guess that would just be like having a rule to elect the
> CWv if there is one, and otherwise to do IRV, which would be a less-good
> relative of Benham & Woodall.
>
> And of course a rule to elect  the CWv is always vulnerable to strategic
> falsification of preferences to make a strategic cycle, with the problems
> that go with that.
>
> In fact, I guess that the candidate-withdrawal option, Steve Eppley's
> original proposal, would, as well, be vulnerable to a faction making a
> strategic cycle, to avoid a result in which the election of the CWv is
> inevitable due to the candidate-withdrawal that will happen if ordinary IRV
> doesn't elect the CWv..
>
> Oh well, so much for that possibility :^)
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
> On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 10:47 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com
> > wrote:
>
>> Speaking of candidate-participation methods, Steve Eppley proposed the
>> simplest one: the Candidate Withdrawal option.
>>
>> When the count result is announced, any candidate has 24 hours in which
>> to announce hir withdrawal from the election, and call for a re-count with
>> hir deleted from the ballots.
>>
>> An IRVist objected to that, because withdrawal betrays the candidate's
>> voters.  Ok, then add a rule that a winning candidate can't withdraw :^)
>>
>> The candidate withdrawal option would completely save IRV from its
>> problem. Candidate-withdrawal should be offered as an amendment to IRV
>> proposals, and also to already-enacted IRV.
>>
>> But, just looking at IRV, the circumstances for wanting to withdraw (Your
>> voters let the CWv get eliminated, by ranking hir 2nd instead of 1st, and
>> hir votes transferred the other way) seem so well-defined and specific as
>> to suggested an automated candidate-withdrawal, built into the IRV
>> count-rule.
>>
>> How about saying that, when that happens, the count rule will delete the
>> 1st choice that is in the way of the eliminated CWv being at the top of the
>> rankings that didn't help CWv because they ranked hir 2nd, and their vote
>> never got to hir?   ...followed by a 2nd count without the deleted 1st
>> choice?
>>
>> ...or it could be an option for the voter to choose if s/he wants that
>> deletion and re-count to occur if hir 1st choice eliminates a CWv,
>> resulting the election of someone over whom you ranked the CWv.   ...where,
>> without that 1st choice, the CWv would have won.
>>
>> That option would only apply to the first election result, and not to
>> subsequent ones.
>>
>> The method could be called "Automatic Strategic Dropping"
>>
>> Or, IRV with that option could be called "Auto-Revotable IRV".
>>
>> I don't like the name IRV. Its meaning isn't a good description. RCV is
>> even worse, because _every_ rank-balloting method is RCV.
>>
>> I'd like to rename IRV as "Delete Least Favorite", "Delete Least Top",
>> "Eliminate Least Favorite" or "Eliminate Least Top".
>>
>> That would be DLF, DLT, ELF, or ELT.  How about ELF?
>>
>> That name goes with my brief definition of the IRV count:
>>
>> Repeatedly, delete from the rankings the candidate currently topping
>> fewest rankings.
>>
>> [end of definition of ELF definition]
>>
>> If that action is repeated, it will eventually leave only one un-deleted
>> candidate.
>>
>> So "Auto-Revotable Eliminate Least Favorite"?
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 6:57 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Nov 12, 2016 at 9:29 PM, Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Yes, it would make sense, and be interesting for a voting-system reform
>>>> proposal to include CVT in its list of offered methods. Offer a complete
>>>> variety, and let the initiative committee &/or the public choose. The
>>>> addition of CVT would greatly broaden the variety. So the list could be:
>>>>
>>>> Approval
>>>> Score
>>>> Bucklin
>>>> MDDTR
>>>> CVT
>>>>
>>>> Actually, it might be best to include IRV, with a fair assessment of
>>>> its advantages & disadvantages, so that people won't think that IRV is
>>>> being prejudcially ignored, and so as to answer, in advance, any arguments
>>>> from FairVote.
>>>>
>>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>>>
>>>> I agree, IRV should be included for the reasons you suggest.
>>>
>>> Also, I think that the inclusion of a NOTA (none of the above) option on
>>> the ballot should be a part of the CTV suggestion:  If NOTA gets the
>>> highest total it means that too few of the voters trust the competence and
>>> integrity of their favorites to act as proxies for them.
>>>
>>
>>
>
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