[EM] Symmetric ICT reformulation and exploration

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Mon Nov 14 21:55:34 PST 2016


But, even if that rule were extended to rescue a CWv that's farther down in
the rankings  I guess that would just be like having a rule to elect the
CWv if there is one, and otherwise to do IRV, which would be a less-good
relative of Benham & Woodall.

And of course a rule to elect  the CWv is always vulnerable to strategic
falsification of preferences to make a strategic cycle, with the problems
that go with that.

In fact, I guess that the candidate-withdrawal option, Steve Eppley's
original proposal, would, as well, be vulnerable to a faction making a
strategic cycle, to avoid a result in which the election of the CWv is
inevitable due to the candidate-withdrawal that will happen if ordinary IRV
doesn't elect the CWv..

Oh well, so much for that possibility :^)

Michael Ossipoff

On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 10:47 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Speaking of candidate-participation methods, Steve Eppley proposed the
> simplest one: the Candidate Withdrawal option.
>
> When the count result is announced, any candidate has 24 hours in which to
> announce hir withdrawal from the election, and call for a re-count with hir
> deleted from the ballots.
>
> An IRVist objected to that, because withdrawal betrays the candidate's
> voters.  Ok, then add a rule that a winning candidate can't withdraw :^)
>
> The candidate withdrawal option would completely save IRV from its
> problem. Candidate-withdrawal should be offered as an amendment to IRV
> proposals, and also to already-enacted IRV.
>
> But, just looking at IRV, the circumstances for wanting to withdraw (Your
> voters let the CWv get eliminated, by ranking hir 2nd instead of 1st, and
> hir votes transferred the other way) seem so well-defined and specific as
> to suggested an automated candidate-withdrawal, built into the IRV
> count-rule.
>
> How about saying that, when that happens, the count rule will delete the
> 1st choice that is in the way of the eliminated CWv being at the top of the
> rankings that didn't help CWv because they ranked hir 2nd, and their vote
> never got to hir?   ...followed by a 2nd count without the deleted 1st
> choice?
>
> ...or it could be an option for the voter to choose if s/he wants that
> deletion and re-count to occur if hir 1st choice eliminates a CWv,
> resulting the election of someone over whom you ranked the CWv.   ...where,
> without that 1st choice, the CWv would have won.
>
> That option would only apply to the first election result, and not to
> subsequent ones.
>
> The method could be called "Automatic Strategic Dropping"
>
> Or, IRV with that option could be called "Auto-Revotable IRV".
>
> I don't like the name IRV. Its meaning isn't a good description. RCV is
> even worse, because _every_ rank-balloting method is RCV.
>
> I'd like to rename IRV as "Delete Least Favorite", "Delete Least Top",
> "Eliminate Least Favorite" or "Eliminate Least Top".
>
> That would be DLF, DLT, ELF, or ELT.  How about ELF?
>
> That name goes with my brief definition of the IRV count:
>
> Repeatedly, delete from the rankings the candidate currently topping
> fewest rankings.
>
> [end of definition of ELF definition]
>
> If that action is repeated, it will eventually leave only one un-deleted
> candidate.
>
> So "Auto-Revotable Eliminate Least Favorite"?
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 6:57 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Nov 12, 2016 at 9:29 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com
>> > wrote:
>>
>>> Yes, it would make sense, and be interesting for a voting-system reform
>>> proposal to include CVT in its list of offered methods. Offer a complete
>>> variety, and let the initiative committee &/or the public choose. The
>>> addition of CVT would greatly broaden the variety. So the list could be:
>>>
>>> Approval
>>> Score
>>> Bucklin
>>> MDDTR
>>> CVT
>>>
>>> Actually, it might be best to include IRV, with a fair assessment of its
>>> advantages & disadvantages, so that people won't think that IRV is being
>>> prejudcially ignored, and so as to answer, in advance, any arguments from
>>> FairVote.
>>>
>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>>
>>> I agree, IRV should be included for the reasons you suggest.
>>
>> Also, I think that the inclusion of a NOTA (none of the above) option on
>> the ballot should be a part of the CTV suggestion:  If NOTA gets the
>> highest total it means that too few of the voters trust the competence and
>> integrity of their favorites to act as proxies for them.
>>
>
>
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